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ABSTRACT 
This thesis assesses four governmental responses to terrorism: conciliation, denial, 
legal restriction, and violence, each of which may be focused on an organization or its leaders. 
The theory makes predictions on the resulting frequency and severity of terrorism. Unless 
responses reduce an organization’s capacity or desire to attack, the frequency of attacks may be 
reduced, while the severity continues to increase. The theory is tested using a time series 
regression analysis of the effects of government action on terrorism in Algeria and the 
Philippines. In general, the results show that conciliation may led to increases in terrorism in 
the short term while suggesting potential reductions in the long term. Denial and legal 
restriction often led to increases in terrorism, while the effects of violence often depended upon 
whether the response was applied to organizations or their leaders. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
Can governmental responses to terrorism create costs and benefits that would make 
terrorism less likely? Dugan and Chenoweth (2012) suggest that conciliatory actions reduce 
terrorism by raising the costs of further violence via threats to benefits gained from governmental 
concessions. In contrast, Trager and Zagorcheva (2006) and Bar (2008) suggest deterrence 
featuring punishment is the surest way to increase costs and thus reduce terrorism. Solely 
punitive responses, however, may have detrimental effects upon the economy and thus have the 
unintended consequence of actually lowering the opportunity costs to support terrorism (Buenos 
de Mesquita & Dickerson 2007). Some suggest that by combining cost imposition and benefit 
denial, governments can avoid lowering opportunity costs (Knoenig & Pavel, 2012; LaFree & 
Dugan, 2009). Certain situational factors, such as economic and political conditions, may yet 
trump the government’s ability to create costs and benefits (Kavanagh, 2011).   
This research project will assess the effectiveness of governmental responses including 
conciliation, denial, legal restriction, and violence (Heymann, 2001-2002; Knopf, 2010; Kroenig, 
2012; Miller, 2007; Trager & Zagorcheva, 2006). This project departs from most research by 
evaluating a response’s ability to reduce both the frequency and severity of terrorism. 
Additionally, rather than dividing responses into broad general categories such as conciliation or 
repression, investigating numerous responses will allow a more nuanced assessment.  
The proposed theory involves three actors: a terrorist organization, a government, and a 
support population. The terrorist organization seeks to change the status quo, usually maintained 
by a government, through violent dramatic action. The terrorist’s true goal is not to kill, but 
2	  
rather to convince the government to change policy. The government may do so if concessions 
allow the government to remain in power; if not, it will resist concessions and dissuade further 
attacks usually through its own use of violence. The terrorist organization usually resides within 
a larger civilian population. This group, the support population, must decide whether to support 
the terrorist organization. This decision is based upon whether it believes the future would be 
better served with more or less terrorism.   
According to the theory, governments can further reduce terrorism by deciding to whom 
to apply these responses. Punitive action, particularly violence, creates the fear of physical 
danger, which may deter existing terrorists while simultaneously deterring future terrorist 
recruitment from the support population. If violence is applied to leaders, this effect may be even 
greater since the residents within the support population will have less to fear from inadvertent 
violence. This avoids the dangers of the support population fearing retaliation regardless of their 
actual behavior, as this would lower the cost of actual participation in terrorism. In contrast, 
conciliatory actions directed towards the largest possible portion of the support population can 
create a public good, arising from peace rather than conflict. If applied solely to leaders, 
conciliation may act as rewards for further terrorism. 
Since terrorism is a diverse phenomenon stemming from a variety of motivations, the 
costs created by governmental responses may affect various types of terrorist organizations 
differently. Organizations that draw support from economically dissatisfied individuals may be 
disproportionately affected by improved economic conditions while the use of violence may not 
deter individuals of faith who have been promised non-material benefits such as spiritual 
salvation. Using time-series regression, government responses to terrorism will be evaluated 
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according to their ability to reduce both the frequency and severity of attacks while controlling 
for political and economic factors as well as terrorist ideology in Algeria and the Philippines 
between 2000-2010.  
Importance of the Topic 
By viewing responses as having two components (action and recipient), it is theorized 
that the most effective responses will be those that impose the greatest costs by combining 
punitive actions against individuals and conciliation towards civilian populations. With the 
majority of terrorists groups disbanding after reentering the political process methods, it is also 
imperative to identity what actions raise the costs of terrorism, raise the benefits of peace, and 
what impediments may inhibit the government’s ability to manipulate these factors (Jones & 
Libicki, 2008).  
This project is also important because it provides realistic expectations for governmental 
action. At any given moment, at least a minority of people in any state will find the current 
political, economic, or social status quo unacceptable. A minority of those will be willing to take 
action, and within that minority, there is yet another smaller group that may accept the use of 
violence, in this case, terrorism. While reducing the existence and/or the magnitude of grievances 
is commendable, far too often the necessary steps to do so are either too costly or impossible to 
implement for a variety of political, ideological, or economic reasons. Governments may yet be 
able to reduce terrorism by raising the costs of participation and thus reduce the number of 




Causes of Terrorism 
Long Term Causes of Terrorism 
A considerable amount of terrorism research discusses the conditions in which terrorism 
is most likely to manifest. The grievance literature is broad, investigating the effects of 
economic, political, or ethnic imbalances (Crenshaw, 1981; Cederman & Girardin, 2007; 
Humphreys & Weinstein, 2006; Kavanagh, 2011; Krueger & Maleckova, 2003). Researchers use 
a wide array of variables to measure grievances within a society including GDP, GDP per capita, 
GDP growth, peace duration, education levels, terrain, polity scores, population densities, 
population size, social fractionalization, and the support of international diasporas (Cederman & 
Girardin, 2007; Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon, 2003; Fearon et al., 2007; Humphreys & 
Weinstein, 2006; Kavanagh, 2011; Krueger & Maleckova, 2003).  
While terrorism has a long history, Crenshaw (1981) highlights a series of technological 
and social changes that have inadvertently assisted terrorist activity. Advances in transportation 
have allowed movement across great distances and created opportunities to dramatically draw 
public attention to political movements such as the Palestinian use of commercial airline 
hijackings in the 1970s (Crenshaw, 1981). Simultaneously, demographic shifts from rural to 
urban communities increased mobility and access to vulnerable targets (Crenshaw, 1981; Davis, 
2010). Unlike insurgency, which depends upon rural bases at the state’s periphery, terrorism may 
be aided more by urban conditions (Crenshaw, 1981).    
Political marginalization is often discussed as one of the major contributions to political 
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violence and terrorism. Proponents suggest political access allows political grievances to be 
resolved peacefully (Davis, 2010; Porch, 2012). In a related fashion, regime type is often 
associated with increases in terrorism. However, both democracies and authoritarian 
governments can contribute to terrorism. A democracy’s respect for civil liberties may inhibit 
effective action. While authoritarian governments lack effective means to address grievances, 
they may also allow enough freedom to allow opposition mobilization. It may be that only 
totalitarian governments have adequate control to repress political opposition (Crenshaw, 1981; 
Cronin, 2006).  
Crenshaw’s (1981) view of grievances is noteworthy because she maintains that political 
violence is not the tool of the downtrodden but rather of the privileged within societies. 
According to Crenshaw, terrorism is most likely to occur not during periods of weakness but 
when a society is strong enough to survive but weak enough to antagonize a sizeable amount of 
the young and educated (Crenshaw, 1981). Ironically, with the majority of the population 
unmoved to rebellion, a small minority possessing a grievance yet also cognizant of the power 
imbalance, may resort to extreme measures in this case, terrorism (Crenshaw, 1981).  
While it is hard to deny their contributory potential, grievances exist around the world 
and yet political violence does not. If grievances were all it took to create political violence then 
there would be even more terrorism (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon, 2003; Fearon et al., 
2007). Some researchers find the effects of political marginalization reduced after controlling for 
economic factors (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon et al., 2007; Fearon & Laitin, 2003). 
Regardless, political freedom as a release valve for political disputes has considerable intuitive 
strength and deserves further investigation.  
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As opposed to lumping grievances, which exist globally across cultures and political 
systems, together, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) divide grievances between those of an economic 
nature (opportunity model) and those arising from political or ethnic strife (grievance model). 
This approach helps to explain the population’s decision process to support terrorism. When 
economic conditions are unfavorable, the costs to support rebellion are reduced (Collier & 
Hoeffler, 2004). These effects are amplified with improved educational levels, resulting from 
increased expectations for employment and a higher quality of life. Like other organizations, 
terrorists seek the best individuals available in the labor pool or in this case, the potential 
recruitment pool. When economic conditions worsen, higher quality individuals are thus 
available for recruitment due to the larger labor pool (Bueno de Mesquita, 2005; Kavanagh, 
2011). 
Immediate Causes for Terrorism 
In addition to long-term grievances, terrorists also execute attacks to achieve short-term 
organizational goals (Crenshaw, 1981). Terrorist organizations may want to draw publicity to 
their cause such as when Palestinian movements conducted commercial airline hijackings in the 
1970s for a global attention. Since terrorism is a form of political rebellion against the 
established order, another reason for terrorism is simply to disrupt and discredit governmental 
power (Crenshaw, 1981). Kydd & Walter focus upon terrorist’s use of violence to drain 
governmental resources through attrition (2006). Other reasons include the solicitation of support 
from sympathizers (Crenshaw, 1981) and the creation of fear amid detractors (Kydd & Walter, 
2006). Terrorism can intimidate those in opposition or encourage at least passive support from 
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the apathetic. When movements are fractured with intense rivalries such as the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization (PLO), terrorism can be used to dominate a movement (Crenshaw, 
1981). Terrorist attacks can signal commitment to garner support from the civilian population in 
a series of outbidding efforts. If the population believes more radical groups will elicit greater 
concessions from the government, the population may increasingly support radical groups. 
However, if the process continues, the population may find itself unable to benefit from any 
concessions as the likelihood of compromise is reduced due to unrealistic demands or an 
unreceptive government (Kydd & Walter, 2006; Kalyvas, 2009). Terrorists may also want to 
deride peace negotiations by launching spoiling attacks (Kydd & Walter, 2006; Shughart, 2006). 
Governments with corrupt or ineffective justice systems allow conditions for intimidation (Kydd 
& Walter, 2006).  
Many terrorists launch attacks to provoke an overreaction from the government. This can 
occur regardless of regime type. Democracies may be tempted to violate their own standards 
regarding civil liberties damaging their sense of legitimacy (Crenshaw, 1981; Kydd & Walter, 
2006; Shugart 2007). In contrast, authoritarian regimes may resort to repressive measures, thus 
alienating an increasing amount of the population that may have otherwise supported the status 
quo (Crenshaw, 1981). According to Perlinger (2012), democracies may be just as willing to 
resort to repression and withhold concessions when facing national separatists. State overreaction 
may result in martyrdom such as the British reaction to the Easter Uprising (Bueno de Mesquita 
& Dickerson, 2007; Crenshaw, 1981). One of the motives of the September 11th attack was for 
the United States to overact, resulting in the establishment of Sharia law across the Middle East 
and a general retreat of American influence (Gordon 2007). In light of this, negative actions 
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should be limited to the fewest potential recipients while positive actions should apply to the 
greatest number creating a situation with the fewest willing recruits.      
Causes of Terrorism on an Individual Basis 
While many researchers discuss the reasons for terrorism, there is little consensus on 
what characteristics make an individual more likely to conduct terrorism. Many suggest these 
individuals may have a higher propensity for thrill seeking (Crenshaw, 1981; Kleinmann, 2012; 
Sageman, 2008). Yet, that hardly assists in creating terrorist profiles. Terrorist organizations, like 
any group have a range of personnel requirements, from leaders with interpersonal skills to 
disposable followers (Bjørgo, 2011). These individuals can come from a variety of ideological 
backgrounds and education levels. These characteristics often determine their position within a 
terrorist hierarchy. The diversity of individual terrorists complicates any attempts to create 
profiles (Bjørgo, 2011; Kavanagh, 2011; Krueger & Maleckova, 2003; Sageman, 2008).   
Research pertaining to individuals increasingly points to the radicalization process, a 
deliberate method to change beliefs allowing an individual to accept the use of violence against 
civilians to bring political change (Porter & Kebbell, 2011; Schmid & Price, 2011; Useem & 
Clayton, 2009). Emotional vulnerability, such as anger or a sense of disenfranchisement, can 
make an individual more susceptible to radicalization (Horgan, 2011). Eventually these 
vulnerable individuals identify with victims of perceived common grievances despite geographic 
and/or cultural distance. Communal or familial groups reinforce these factors (Carter & Carter, 
2012; Horgan, 2008; Sageman, 2008). Identification with perceived victims occurs particularly 
among second and third generation immigrants who may perceive barriers to full integration in 
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new societies. Eventually, violent acts lose all moral or religious sanction typically restrained by 
societal norms (Gaynor, 2011; Sageman, 2008). For instance, Osama bin Laden in his “Letter to 
America” describes western assaults upon Islamic societies in Somalia and Chechnya as well as 
western support for repressive regimes in the Middle East (Bin Laden, 2002). It should be noted 
that Muslim populations are no more susceptible to radicalization than others. Ryan (2007) 
describes how both Islamic and Irish terrorist groups utilize four themes in their radicalization 
process: “persecution, precedent, piety, and perseverance” (p. 985).  
As individuals see themselves connected to more deprived individuals, they may 
increasingly become susceptible to a sense of survivors guilt. Unsatisfied with injustices, they 
lash out against an unjust world (Crenshaw, 1981). The cycle of guilt and resulting violence 
creates increased separation between individual terrorists and the society they reside in. This 
increased detachment lowers the terrorist’s inhibitions against violence and thus the cycle 
continues in a downward spiral. This is critical since it potentially destroys any realistic options 
to reenter society through reconciliation programs, leaving governments little choice, but to 
resort to violence towards a violent minority within a minority, the terrorist organization 
(Crenshaw, 1981; Davis & Jenkins, 2002).    
Types of Terrorist Groups 
Since different types of groups will have different types of demands, it may be important 
to identify the type of terrorist organization when debating the appropriate responses. Gregory 
Miller (2007) divides terrorist groups into four classifications using their ideologies: national-
separatist, revolutionary, reactionary, and religious. National-separatist groups are motivated to 
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create an autonomous political entity separate from an existing state. Examples include the Tamil 
Tigers of Sri Lanka (LTTE), the Irish Republican Army (IRA), and the Kurdish Worker’s Party 
(PKK). These groups are often connected to larger ethnic groups and/or political affiliations. 
While the populations they claim to represent may not support their violent methods, these 
populations may still endorse their goals. In contrast, revolutionaries seek to remold a society 
rather than separate themselves from another. These groups are often associated with leftist 
groups attempting to change the prevailing economic system of the society. Examples include 
the Red Army Faction (RAF) in Germany and the Red Brigade in Italy (Gregory Miller, 2007). 
Conversely, reactionary groups seek to counter revolutionaries. Examples include the Afrikaner 
Resistance Movement (AWB) of South Africa, neo-fascist groups such as the New Order of 
Italy, and the Contras of Nicaragua. The last group uses religious doctrine to support the use of 
violence for political motivations. Examples include Al Qaeda and Hezbollah, although 
Hezbollah is problematic because it has expanded its operations beyond terrorism to more 
mundane political participation in domestic politics (Miller, 2007). Seth Jones and Martin 
Libicki (2008) classify terrorist groups according to their placement along a political spectrum. 
Their classifications are left wing, right wing, nationalist, and religious (Jones & Libicki, 2008).   
Rather than dividing terrorist groups by their specific ideologies, Richardson (2007) 
divides terrorist groups by the magnitude of their goals. Temporal goals can be achieved without 
radically changing the existing political system. For instance, the secession of Kashmir from 
India, while costly to the Indian government, is nonetheless negotiable. In contrast, 
transformational goals are by their nature not negotiable since they require a complete restructure 
of the existing order. In addition, Richardson distinguishes between terrorist groups that are 
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closely connected to the community and those that are isolated. Davis & Jenkins (2002) also 
divide terrorist organizations by their pragmatism.  
Rather than assign specific attributes to various types of terrorist organizations, others 
investigate internal characteristics. Horowitz (2007) investigates the links between organizational 
age and the propensity to adopt suicide bombings. According to Horowitz, when new 
organizations have religious motivations as well as links to groups that have already adopted 
suicide tactics, the risk increases 600 percent (2003). 
Responses 
Academics propose a wide variety of state responses to terrorism. Quite a few offer broad 
categories such as conciliation and repression (Bueno de Mesquita, July 2005; Dugan & 
Chenoweth, 2012; Sederberg, 1995), discriminate and indiscriminate violence (Kalyvas, 2009; 
Lyall, 2009), or indirect and direct responses (Bar, 2012; Kroenig & Pavel, 2012). Others 
suggest lists of more specific responses (Amos & Stolfi, 1984; Miller, 2007).  
Conciliatory actions are rewards that raise the costs of participating in terrorism while 
repressive actions attempt to punish terrorist acts and/or support for terrorism. Governments 
often view concessions unfavorably since modern history is rife with examples of violent spikes 
following concessions (Bueno de Mesquita, 2005; Sederberg, 1995). For instance, Basque 
separatists launched a wave of violence despite concessions of autonomy to the Basque region in 
1978. Both Israel and Northern Ireland endured increased violence following peace accords in 
1993 and 1998 respectively. According to Bueno de Mesquita, conciliation leads to increased 
violence in the short term with long-term reductions (2005). Since conciliation may appease 
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moderates, elements that are more radical may assume leadership roles, leading to more violence 
immediately following successful negotiations. Yet, with defecting moderates providing valuable 
information, this could lead to long-term reductions in terrorist capabilities (Gurr, 1998). 
Additionally, since moderates most likely outnumber radicals, a considerable portion of support 
is drained when moderates defect (Bueno de Mesquita, 2005). Sederberg suggests that repression 
and conciliation are more effective when combined, making it possible to appease moderates 
while repressing extremists (1995). This however requires high quality information to distinguish 
one form the other.   
Dugan & Chenoweth describe how repressive attacks can lead to a backlash of terrorist 
attacks while conciliatory actions raise the utility of reduced terrorism (2012). Positive effects 
from conciliatory actions are often continent upon how they are applied, discriminately or 
indiscriminately. When governments act discriminately, they apply responses to those 
responsible for attacks (Dugan & Chenoweth, 2012; Kalyvas, 2009). When acting 
indiscriminately, governments apply responses to the guilty as well as the innocent. If 
conciliatory actions are applied indiscriminately to both terrorists and the larger surrounding 
population, the benefits from concessions form a type of public good. Fearing the loss of these 
public goods, the public may support terrorists less or even actively oppose them. However, if 
governments give concessions to terrorists then radicals benefit from increased terrorism, and 
since no public good is created, the public has little incentive to oppose violence (Dugan & 
Chenoweth 2012).   
In contrast, some researchers find support for indiscriminate responses. Lyall (2009) 
finds that Russian artillery barrages reduced insurgent attacks in Chechnya. Porch (2012) finds 
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violence may have short term effects that dissipate unless followed by concessions. While Lyall 
(2009) and Porch (2012) concentrate on insurgency, both insurgency and terrorism are forms of 
rebellion, involving at least tacit support from surrounding populations, and are therefore still 
relevant (Trinquier, 1964).    
Although broad, these categories have significant implications. If a population feels as 
though it will be punished through indiscriminate violence regardless of its actions, it may 
actually be encouraged to support terrorism. However, if a state uses discriminate violence, the 
general population may prefer the status quo or even a future with minor concessions (Kalyvas, 
2009). The ability to use discriminate violence is determined by the availability and quality of 
information (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2006; Kalyvas, 2009; Traeger & Zagorcheva, 
2005/2006).   
There are several practical issues when determining whether an action is discriminate. 
This project’s original research design included degrees of discrimination. However, during the 
coding process, it was deemed impossible to responsibly assign these judgments to specific 
actions. There are also inherent issues with discrimination beyond the practical limitations of 
coding. If the support population believes the government relies on faulty information, from their 
perspective, the government is acting in an indiscriminate manner despite the government’s 
intention to act discriminately.  
Broad categories defining governmental response are also criticized for lacking the detail 
necessary for proper evaluation (Amos & Stolfi, 1982; Miller, 2007). Gregory Miller (2007) 
provides a menu of options including “do nothing, conciliation, legal reform, restriction, and 
violence" (p. 334-335). While it seems unlikely that governments would do nothing in the face of 
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terrorism, there are examples, for instance, Italy’s tolerance of Palestinian terrorist organizations. 
Conciliation is when the government offers concessions or at minimal enters negotiations, as in 
the case of ceding territory to a separatist group. Legal reforms are attempts to increase 
governmental powers and authority to use against terrorism. Examples include the US Patriot 
Act (2001) and British Terrorism Acts (2000 & 2006). Restriction is an attempt to limit a group’s 
mobility usually through curfews or hardening targets with improved defenses.1 The last 
response, violence is the government’s use of force to kill or capture terrorists through a wide 
range of activities from targeted assassinations to arrests (Miller, 2007). Amos and Stolfi (1984) 
discuss similar responses; however, they also add state media exploitation. Since terrorism is a 
form of violent theater, terrorist groups often attempt to shape public opinion through violent 
public attacks. As such, governments may be tempted to shape or censor media coverage.  
Whether one uses broad categories or specific actions to describe potential responses, 
violence is an important component of nearly all of them. Violence is of course related to 
deterrence, which is a threat or action taken by an actor to prevent an action by another that 
would otherwise had taken place after the former considered the costs and benefits of that action 
(Freedman, 2004; Kroenig & Pavel, 2012; Morgan, 2003; Schelling, 1966). Deterrence is 
successful when an adversary fears the imposed costs of retaliation. These costs can be 
casualties, loss of equipment, and the opportunity costs associated with maintaining a military 
1	  Sageman (2008) and Gordon (2007) relate counterterrorism to containment in the sense that 
overt long-term conflict should be avoided while still opposing violent fundamentalism. Both 
share the belief that religious terror networks rely upon a moral indignation dependent upon a 
particular worldview as well as personal relationships. Terrorist attacks serve as public catalyst 
for inspiration and recruitment. If properly contained through denial and restriction, without 
governments resorting to provocative actions that could potentially legitimize terrorist causes, 
these movements may succumb to infighting (Gordan, 2007; Sageman, 2008).   
15	  
force (Mearsheimer, 1995). There are numerous requirements for successful deterrence, such as 
rationality and successfully communicating and understanding potential threats (Trager & 
Zagorcheva, 2005/2006).2 These threats, whether implicit or explicit, must be understood and 
believed according to estimated capabilities and political will (Trager & Zagorcheva, 
2005/2006). The precision necessary to send and receive intended messages makes deterrence 
difficult and potentially dangerous. If actors are incapable of formulating meaningful signals, and 
recipents are unable to understand them with the intended meanings, then deterence may escalate 
to unnecessary conflict (Jervis et al., 1985).   
Many researchers explore whether deterrence is feasible considering terrorists are often 
seen as irrational, willing to die, or difficult to find (Caplan, 2006; Kroenig and Pavel, 2000; 
Sprinzak, 2000; Trager & Zagorcheva, 2005/2006). However, terrorist organizations, like all 
organizations, assign responsibilities to individuals according to their roles: leaders plan, soldiers 
execute attacks, recruiters replenish losses and garner support from surrounding populations,  
external support from diasporas or even state sponsorship. Each of these components has 
different characteristics and preferences that governments can exploit to achieve deterrence 
(Caplan, 2006; Davis & Jenkins, 2002; Fisher, 2007; Kroenig & Pavel, 2000; Schmitt & 
Shanker, 2011).  
Despite their reputations, high-level terrorist leaders rarely expose themselves to direct 
action; targeting these leaders may prove effective to deter organizations (Bar, 2008; Fisher, 
2007). Even individuals of supposedly unshakeable religious conviction can be deterred. Despite 
2	  Rational actors are assumed to gather information pertinent to the situation, assess possible 
actions according to the costs and benefits associated with implementation and finally select an 
action that has the largest benefit for the smallest effort (Morgan, 2003; Freedman, 2004; 
Kroenig & Pavel, 2012).	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the public proclamation to fight until death, hundreds of Palestinian Islamic Jihad fighters 
surrendered to Israeli forces in 2002 (Fisher, 2007). Even if leaders were too ideologically driven 
to negotiate, the vast majority of individuals within their movements should still respond to 
normal incentives (Caplan, 2006). While violence may have its purpose under certain situations, 
overreliance upon violence can be dangerous possibly creating power vacuums, martyrdom, or 
perceptions of indiscrimination due to inaccurate information regarding terrorist identities 
(Heymann, 2002; Kalyvas, 2004).   
The above literature review helped formulate the parameters of this investigation in 
numerous ways. The long term causes of terrorism helped to identify control variables such as 
urbanization, economic and political freedom, and economic development (Crenshaw, 1981; 
Collier and Hoelffer, 2004; Bueno de Mesquita, 2005; Kavanangh, 2011).3 While the literature 
on the short causes of terrorism helped formulate the hypotheses. For instance, conciliation may 
actually increase terrorism in the short term due to spoiling attacks with potential long term 
reductions due to improved intelligence from defectors (Bueno de Mesquita, 2005; Crenshaw, 
1981; Gurr, 1998; Kydd & Walter, 2006). The responses proposed by Miller (2007) formed the 
basis of the responses included in this investigation. Dugan & Chenoweth (2012) were 
instrumental in shaping the method of investigation. Finally, a review of the literature shows 
there are numerous datasets covering actual attacks but few resources devoted to governmental 
responses. In order to address this absence, this project developed two entirely new datasets to 
assess Algerian and Philippine responses to terrorism. 
3	  The	  investigation	  later	  had	  to	  discard	  political	  development	  due	  to	  a	  lack	  in	  variation	  in	  the	   selected	   time	   period,	   2000-­‐2010;	   however,	   the	   manner	   in	   which	   economic	  development	  was	  assessed	  included	  many	  important	  political	  elements	  such	  as	  corruption	  and	  government	  spending.	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Description of Thesis Chapters 
The next chapter discusses the theory, limitations and assumptions, as well as alterative 
explanations. Since this investigation relies upon two newly created datasets, the entire third 
chapter is devoted to the methodology for data collection and analysis. Chapters four and five are 
quantitative assessments of governmental responses and their ability to reduce the overall 
frequency and severity of terrorism in Algeria and the Philippines. They will also assess whether 
these responses affected various terrorist groups differently. Both chapters will begin with 
backgrounds to the respective conflicts within the countries. Chapter five will have a discussion 
section that compares the results and discusses any resulting policy implications. Any identified 
weaknesses of either the theory or the testing method will also be addressed. The chapter and the 
thesis will conclude with propositions for future research.     
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CHAPTER TWO: THEORY 
Introduction 
This theory centers upon the interaction between three actors: terrorist organizations, the 
government, and a potential support population for terrorism. Terrorists wish to change 
governmental policy through violence applied to civilian populations. Governments must choose 
a response and decide whether to apply it to the group or its leadership. The support population 
must decide whether to support the terrorist or government.4 
Definitions 
Definitions for terrorism are almost as numerous as the recommendations to combat it. 
Drawing upon a variety of sources, terrorism is premeditated politically motivated violence 
against non-combatants in order to change governmental policy (Amos & Stolfi, 1982; LaFree & 
Dugan, 2009; Sandler & Siqueria, 2006). Large political movements can produce these groups 
when alternative peaceful means to achieve their political goals are unavailable (Crenshaw, 
1981; Guevara, 1961; Gurr, 1998; Jones & Libicki, 2008). Terrorism is closely related to 
insurgency, as both are methods of rebellion. Insurgents can use terrorism to create anarchy 
within the state, weakening the incumbent government, making revolution more attainable 
(Galula, 1964).  
4 Likewise, Berman et al., (2012) have a model of insurgency with three actors: the rebel, the 
government, and civilians. Siqueira & Sandler's model (2006) of terrorism has three actors as 
well: a terrorist group, a government, and a terrorist support base. 	  	  While the support 
population is an important component in the theory, unfortunately, the coding process 
did not reveal attempts by the the Algerian and Philippine governments to address the 
support populations. This issue will be discussed in the concluding chapter. 
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All three actors are assumed to be rational actors in the sense that they can prioritize 
outcomes as well as select actions necessary to achieve goals (Caplan, 2006; Huth & Russet, 
1984). Terrorism, particularly suicide terrorism, is seen as rational because it reflects a decision 
that places more value on the fear created by an attack compared to the value an individual 
brings to an organization (Pape, 2003). The very decision to engage in terrorism in the first place 
represents a terrorist organization’s desire to achieve political change with the smallest amount 
of resources through the maximization of limited assets (Betts, 2002). In addition, terrorists must 
assume governments have the capacity to be rational; the government must be capable of 
weighing continued violence against the costs of conciliation. The government’s ability to retain 
power is usually contingent upon the support of its population (Buenos de Mesquita et al., 
2003).5 It is reasonable to assume that states prefer less frequent and less severe terrorist attacks, 
as these attacks are direct challenges to the state’s ability to protect its citizens and faith in the 
government. The support population is assumed to be rational as it must select not only who to 
support but also the amount of its commitment, which is generally based upon a comparison 
between the status quo and a potential future with more or less terrorism.   
Actors 
The Terrorist 
The first actor, the terrorist organization, uses violence in pursuit of political goals 
(Dugan & Chenoweth, 2012; Enders & Sandler, 1993; LaFree & Dugan, 2009; Trager & 
Zagorcheva, 2005/2006). Ideologies may differ but each terrorist group possesses a particular 
5	  This is particularly true within democracies (Buenos de Mesquita et al., 2003). 
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grievance or set of grievances yet lacks the necessary power to bring about change through 
conventional methods (Betts, 2002). Their grievances are often related to their ideology and can 
be categorized accordingly as national-separatists, revolutionary, reactionary, and religious 
groups (Miller, 2007). Specific attacks are related to organizational goals such as obtaining 
publicity, intimidating potential informants, disrupting governmental services, spoiling peace 
negotiations, as well as outbidding other groups for leadership of a resistance movement 
(Crenshaw, 1981; Davis 2010; Enders & Sandler 1993; Kydd & Walters, 2006). Terrorists also 
attack to provoke an overreaction from the government potentially alienating prospective 
supporters (Bueno de Mesquita & Dickerson 2007; Crenshaw, 1981; Kydd & Walter, 2006). 
These attacks are designed to create fear not among the immediate victims but within a much 
broader audience, those within the state that have enough influence with the government to 
change policies (Miller, 2007).6  
Terrorists attack to create fear yet their victims are often members of the very same 
community it draws support. Because of this, terrorist must be mindful not to alienate the support 
population. If the violence threatens the welfare of the support population, former allies may 
become informants for the government (Galula, 1964; Gurr, 1998). To prevent defection, 
terrorists threaten retaliation and/or provide competing services to those offered by the 
government (Berman et al., 2012). Terrorist activity can be reduced by either a loss of capability 
(material support, manpower, etc.) or the fear of losing necessary popular support, which 
threatens their capabilities. Since terrorism requires a relatively small number of active 
6	  Buenos	  de	  Mesquita	  et	  al.	  	  (2003)	  refer	  to	  this	  segment	  of	  a	  state	  as	  the	  “winning	  coalition.”	  Who	  is	  a	  member	  of	  this	  group	  depends	  upon	  the	  internal	  politics	  of	  the	  state	  and	  often	  related	  to	  its	  regime	  type.	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participants, at least relative to larger forms of rebellion such as insurgency or conventional 
warfare, determining what is the necessary amount of popular support is problematic (Lawrence 
2008; Sageman, 2008; Weinberg, 1991).  
The Government 
Governments seek to reduce levels of future violence and avoid concessions (Bueno de 
Mesquita, 2005). It can be represented by an individual or agency involved in official activity 
conducted to reduce terrorism ranging from law enforcement, political bodies, or military 
personnel (Kennedy et al., 2012). The government seeks to reduce the frequency and severity of 
attacks by convincing the terrorist organization that continued violence is not only harmful to 
their physical well-being but also counterproductive to their goals. The government also seeks to 
convince the support population (a community that the terrorist organization identifies with and 
potentially draws support) that violence is not the optimal means by which to improve the status 
quo and, therefore, to no longer support the terrorist organization through active or passive 
means (Huth & Russett, 1984; Kennedy et al., 2012). Terrorists believe that with enough 
violence, the government will change its policies. While the government desires less violence, 
the amount it is willing to concede is dependent upon the severity and frequency of attacks as 
well as the cost of complying with the terrorist demand (Dugan & Chenoweth, 2012; LaFree & 
Dugan, 2009; Miller, 2007). 
Governmental responses are often restricted. While enjoying an overwhelming advantage 
in conventional power, its ability to use these advantages is curtailed by internal and 
international norms regarding civil liberties and civilian casualties (Bar, 2008). Governments 
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choose responses available to them to increase the costs of terrorism. These increased costs deter 
current terrorists while deterring members of the support population from joining or giving 
passive support such as retaining information from the government (Fearon & Laitin 2003; 
Kalyvas, 2009; Trager & Zagorcheva, 2006). 
The government can choose from a variety of responses. This research design modifies 
the list proposed by Miller (2007). It is believed using these responses will allow greater 
variation to judge governmental responses more effectively. The following are the proposed 
responses: conciliation, denial, legal reform restriction, and violence.  
Conciliatory actions raise the cost of continued terrorism (Amos and Stolfi, 1982; Dugan 
and Chenoweth, 2012; LaFree & Dugan, 2009; Miller, 2007). Governments choose conciliatory 
actions when counterterrorism campaigns will cost more than concessions. The government’s 
core supporters must be willing to accept any proposed concessions. The amount the government 
is willing to negotiate is dependent upon the severity and frequency of attacks as well as the cost 
of complying with the terrorist demand (Dugan & Chenoweth, 2012; LaFree & Dugan, 2009; 
Miller, 2007).  
If the government chooses to make concessions through conciliatory actions, the terrorist 
must decide whether to accept the offer or continue terrorism. Concessions can draw popular 
support from terrorist groups if the offered concessions are viewed as sufficient. For instance,  
Canadian concessions regarding Quebec autonomy successfully reduced terrorism levels (Lafee 
and Dugan, 2009). If the terrorist chooses to accept the offer, the government may demand 
cooperation from former terrorists. Those that continue to fight are most likely the extreme 
elements of their movement. Ironically, although the government has created a schism in the 
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terrorist movement, the frequency and severity of attacks may actually increase in the short term 
due to a more radical leadership and a desire to spoil negotiations. However, if the government 
successfully obtains information from defectors, future governmental action will be more 
effective causing long-term reductions in terrorism.7 Conciliation with leaders has the same 
potential for spoiling attacks without the benefits of offering benefits to the majority of members. 
The increase in frequency and severity should be even more pronounced. 
Both sides fear the other’s commitment to any settlement. The government fears 
continued violence and former terrorists withholding information. Former terrorist fear the 
government abandoning its pledges following disarmament (Bueno de Mesquita, 2005). While 
commitment issues are important they are simply beyond the scope of this research project. 
H1A: Conciliation with groups will increase the frequency of terrorist attacks during a 
four-month period. 
H1B: Conciliation with groups will increase the severity of terrorist attacks during a four-
month period. 
H1C: Conciliation with leaders will increase the frequency of terrorist attacks during 
a four-month period to a greater extent than conciliation with groups.  
H1D: Conciliation with leaders will increase the severity of terrorist attacks during a 
four-month period to a greater extent than conciliation with groups 
Acts of denial strengthen defenses such as installing metal detectors at airports or 
enacting curfews (Adams 2003; Freedman, 2004; Heymann 2001/2002; Knopf, 2010; Trager & 
Zagorcheva, 2005/2006). Even if improved defenses and safety measures decrease the frequency 
7	  It	  was	  impossible	  to	  statically	  assess	  the	  long	  term	  effects	  of	  governmental	  responses	  due	  to	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  investigation,	  2000-­‐2010.	  An	  annual	  unit	  of	  analysis	  would	  only	  allow	  10	  observations;	  therefore,	  a	  monthly	  unit	  of	  analysis	  was	  selected.	  	  Long	  term	  effects	  are	  however	  discussed	  in	  the	  final	  chapter.	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of attacks, terrorists may simply shift their attacks to more vulnerable targets (Sprinzak 2000). 
Rather than reducing terrorism, Enders & Sandler show that terrorists often shift to different, less 
defended targets (1993). Following improved airport security after a series of airline hijackings 
of the 1970s, terrorists shifted to less costly attacks such as assassinations (Sprinzak 2000). With 
increased reconnaissance requirements arising from the need to find vulnerable targets, the 
frequency of attacks may decrease. However, due to more lengthy planning periods and the 
concentration of resources, attacks may become more effective, resulting in an increase in 
severity.  
H2A: Denial will reduce the frequency of terrorist attacks during a four-month period. 
H2B: Denial will increase the severity of terrorist attacks during a four-month period. 
Legal restrictions are enacted to increase the government’s abilities to counter terrorism. 
If the government has strong support among the general population, it may consider restriction 
through legal reform. If, popular support is lacking or if the government is an authoritarian 
regime, then it may bypass legislative reforms and simply declare emergency powers. 
Regardless, the result is enhanced governmental authority and power. Legal restriction is similar 
to denial, while the latter focuses on the physical barriers to mobility, legal restriction focuses on 
authority. Both intend to reduce the ease of launching attacks; however, they do little to reduce 
the capacity to launch attacks in the short term. The reduced frequency of attacks may have the 
unintended consequence of forcing terrorists to pool resources resulting in an increase in the 
severity of attacks.  
H3A: Legal restriction will decrease the frequency of terrorist attacks during a four-
month period. 
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H3B: Legal restriction will increase the severity of terrorist attacks during a four-month 
period. 
Violence is when the government attempts to kill or capture terrorists through a wide 
range of activities such as targeted assassinations or raids (Davis & Jenkins, 2002; Kroenig & 
Pavel, 2012; Miller, 2007; Trager & Zagorcheva, 2005/2006; Sandler & Siqueiros, 2006). In 
isolation, violence may alienate members of the support population. Terrorist groups will seek to 
demonstrate their resolve to both the government and the support population following even 
successful violent operations. However, due to violent governmental action, their capabilities 
may be reduced (Posen 2001/2002). Follow on attacks may be conducted in a hasty fashion, 
lacking proper assets and coordination (Byman, 2006). Violence against leaders will reduce both 
the frequency and severity of attacks due to the organizations reduced planning and coordination 
capabilities. 
H4A: Violence towards groups will increase the frequency of attacks during a four-month 
period.  
H4B: Violence towards groups will decrease the severity of terrorist attacks during a 
four-month period.  
H4C: Violence targeting leaders will decrease the frequency of terrorist attacks during a 
four-month period. 
H4D: Violence targeting leaders will decrease the severity of terrorist attacks during a 
four-month period.  
Alternative Explanations 
This research makes no distinction between domestic and transnational terrorism or the 
pragmatism of particular terrorist goals (temporal/transformational goals). While perhaps 
important distinctions, they are simply beyond the scope of this research project. The difference 
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between temporal and transformational goals may be more important than the specific type of 
ideology. For instance, there may be important differences between a religious group that wants 
to install Sharia law in its own country and another religious group that wants to create an 
Islamic caliphate across the Middle East (Davis & Jenkins, 2002; Richardson, 2007). 
Considerable effort was made to differentiate governmental responses as opposed to 
solely using broader categories such conciliation and repression (Dugan & Chenoweth 2012; 
Lyall 2009). However, using these specific responses may be no more insightful considering a 
response’s scale is still not taken into account. For instance, a government could conduct military 
operations with 100 or 1000 personnel. Resource allocation could send powerful commitment 
signals to both terrorists and support populations.8    
Even if the government is effective in creating costs and benefits, various types of 
terrorist organizations may react differently based upon their ideology or degree of support from 
diasporas and/or state sponsors. External support may reduce the government’s ability to impose 
costs upon terrorist organizations or support populations. With considerable outside support, 
terrorist organizations may be less responsive to the concerns of the support population, reducing 
the effects of conciliatory actions regardless of how or to whom they are applied (Siqueira & 
Sandler, 2006).9  
8 An attempt was made to assess the scale of large troop movements using the log of 
deployments of troops beyond company level. They were omitted due to higher collinearity with 
other manifestations of violence such as arrests and the killing of terrorist suspects.  
9 Collier & Hoeffler (2004) use the number of foreign immigrants in the United States as a proxy 
for diasporas support; however, this was deemed unsatisfactory since there is no way to 
determine if the minority group actually supported terrorism. An attempt was also made to  
control for foreign government support using the BAAD-1 database and Terrorist 
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Key Assumptions and Limitations 
It is assumed all three actors are rational. This is essential. The terrorist must be able to 
measure costs imposed by governmental action such as violence against its leadership. 
Governments must be able to weigh the costs and benefits of conciliatory actions particularly 
when domestic populations have the means to punish the government for unpopular actions as in 
elections. Governments must also consider how other terrorist groups will react to government 
concessions to a particular movement or terrorist organization. Support populations must be able 
to weigh the costs of defecting while considering whether the state is acting discriminately or 
indiscriminately.   
In addition, since the theory is dependent upon cost imposition, it may not be appropriate 
for lone wolf terrorists. This may become increasing problematic as instances of lone wolf 
terrorism increase. Examples include the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995 and Theodore 
Kaczynski, but also increasingly with self-radicalized Islamic terrorists, such as when 
Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad attacked an army recruiting station in Little Rock, Arkansas 
(Carter & Carter, 2012).  
The case selection may create data availability issues. The wire services may not 
adequately capture governmental actions in remote areas. It may also arise from language 
barriers. This possibility is reduced for the Philippines as English is one of its official languages, 
while Arabic is Algeria’s official language.10  
Organization Profile database; however, due to conflicting reports within these datasets and other 
resources, the degree of foreign support was omitted. 	  10	  While	  not	  an	  official	  language,	  French	  is	  widely	  used	  by	  government	  officials.	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Contributions to Literature 
Rather than simply deciding between broad responses, this research design investigates a 
series of potential responses. In addition, few studies that address specific responses adequately 
control for economic and political factors not to mention terrorist ideologies. While not specified 
as control variables, terrorist ideology was accounted for by investigating not just the frequency 
or severity of terrorism at the national level but also by individual terrorist groups reflecting 
religious as well as revolutionary groups. Additionally by investigating the effects of 
governmental responses on both the frequency and severity of terrorism, we will hopefully gain a 
more nuanced understanding of the unintended consequences of counterterrorism policy. Lastly, 
by differentiating between actions that target groups or leaders, we can assess various means to 
impose the greatest benefits to those that forgo terrorism while imposing the greatest costs to 
irreconcilable terrorists.  
29	  
CHAPTER THREE: METHDOLOGY 
Introduction 
Using time series regression, governmental responses to terrorist attacks between 2000-
2010 in Algeria and the Philippines will be evaluated according to their ability to reduce both the 
frequency and severity of attacks while controlling for economic and political factors. The 
period, 2000-2010, was selected in order to have lagged variables with the available economic 
and political datasets.11 Data was collected from September 1999 to December 2010 to allow for 
lagged variables. 
Case Selection 
Algeria and the Philippines were selected to allow for the greatest amount of 
generalizability despite having two cases. The Philippines is a democracy while Algeria is an 
anocracy according to Polity IV.12 This difference may show certain regimes are more prone to 
different responses. It may also show that there are variations in how regimes react to different 
types of terrorist groups. Both allow for religious variation. The majority of Algerians are 
Muslim while in the Philippines, the majority are Roman Catholics. While not a focus of this 
project, it will be interesting to see if religious attributes have an impact upon governmental 
responses. Will Algeria, a majority Islamic country, react to religious groups the same way the 
11	  The	  Heritage	  Index	  of	  Economic	  Freedom	  has	  data	  available	  from	  1995-­‐2013,	  while	  the	  World	  Bank	  and	  Polity	  IV	  datasets	  have	  extensive	  amounts	  of	  data	  for	  decades.	  The	  POLITY	  IV	  dataset	  as	  a	  control	  variable	  was	  omitted	  due	  to	  a	  lack	  in	  data	  variation.	  	  12	  Polity	  IV	  has	  considered	  the	  Philippines	  a	  democracy	  following	  the	  popular	  overthrow	  of	  President	  Marcos	  in	  1987	  (Polity	  IV	  Country	  Report	  2010:	  Philippines).	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Philippines reacts considering their majority Roman Catholic populations? Ethnically, Algeria is 
nearly homogenous while the Philippines is highly heterogeneous with no ethnic group 
comprising more than 30 percent of either population (CIA Factbook).13 
Between 2000 and 2010, both Algeria and the Philippines suffered over 500 terrorist 
attacks (Global Terrorism Database).14 According to the Global Terrorism Index, Algeria and the 
Philippines have been consistently in the top 10 states affected by terrorism. In addition, the 
cases were selected in order to allow variation in the types of terrorist organizations; each have a 
range of terrorist organizations including revolutionary and religious groups.15  
Variables 
Dependent Variables 
The dependent variables, the frequency (total number of incidents in a month) and 
severity (total casualties including wounded and killed in a month) of attacks were obtained from 
the Global Terrorist Database (GTD) produced by the Study of Terrorism and Responses to 
Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland. In order to restrict the data to terrorism rather 
than criminal activity or insurgency several criteria were used. The attacks must have been in 
support of a political goal, there must have been an attempt to coerce a larger audience, and they 
must be outside the bounds of legitimate warfare, such as the intentional targeting civilians or 
13 N i n e t y  n i n e   percent  of  Algerians  are  Arab-Berbers;  however,  only  fifteen  percent 
self-dentity as Berbers (CIA Factbook). 
14 These figures used the most restrictive criteria to ensure the data truly reflected terrorist 
activity  as  opposed  to  insurgency.  Without  these  restrictions,  Algeria  and  the  Philippines  
have over 1200 attacks according to the GTD.  
15 Unfortunately, the Moro National Liberation Front, a national separatist group, had to be 
omitted due to a lack of activity between 2000-- 2010.  
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non-combatants. All ambiguous cases were excluded. All unsuccessful attacks were included. 
The aforementioned criteria are options provided by the GTD.  
The frequency and severity of attacks in Algeria and the Philippines were aggregated on a 
monthly basis by country as well as by individual terrorist groups from 2000 to 2010. These 
distinctions were important to see if governmental responses had similar effects across a variety 
of terrorist organizations. In Algeria, the investigation included Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 
(AQIM) and the Armed Islamic Groups (GIA). Since AQIM and the Salafist Group for Call and 
Combat (GSPC) are essentially the same organiation, the frequency and severity of both 
organizations were combined under AQIM. The background section will discuss this relationship 
in detail. In the Philippines, the investigation included Abu Sayyaf (ASG), Jemaah Islamiyah 
(JI), the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and the New People's Army (NPA). Attacks by 
unknown perpetrators were also individually assessed for both countries. Terrorist groups with 
three or less attacks between 2000 and 2010, according to the GTD, were included in the overall 
assessments however excluded from individual investigation. For a summary of the frequency 
and severity, see  Table 1: Frequency and Severity of Terrorism by Country and Perpetrator
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Table 1: Frequency and Severity of Terrorism by Country and Perpetrator 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Case 
Freq Freq Freq Freq Freq Freq Freq Freq Freq Freq Freq 
Algeria 79 84 87 49 29 36 61 52 43 27 15 
AQIM 9 10 8 20 12 15 29 33 18 11 4 
GIA 8 15 24 10 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 
UNK 60 58 54 19 17 19 32 19 25 16 10 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Case 
Sev Sev Sev Sev Sev Sev Sev Sev Sev Sev Sev 
Algeria 520 680 679 253 184 155 202 626 295 189 71 
AQIM 31 45 27 123 29 69 108 583 226 157 33 
GIA 80 118 283 73 8 11 0 0 0 0 0 
UNK 401 516 364 57 147 75 94 43 69 32 36 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Case 
Freq Freq Freq Freq Freq Freq Freq Freq Freq Freq Freq 
Philippines 97 42 35 74 22 16 46 53 74 76 67 
ASG 14 11 16 3 4 9 4 3 3 7 7 
JI 5 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 0 0 0 
MILF 55 11 4 50 3 0 2 3 21 8 1 
NPA 7 8 11 12 9 6 11 10 27 23 19 
UNK 14 11 3 9 6 1 26 29 23 36 40 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Case 
Sev Sev Sev Sev Sev Sev Sev Sev Sev Sev Sev 
Philippines 862 290 377 649 254 139 184 429 184 221 104 
ASG 95 127 306 8 126 131 33 22 6 22 31 
JI 122 0 0 0 0 0 0 113 0 0 0 
MILF 477 60 9 585 84 0 5 3 98 53 0 
NPA 65 21 30 39 32 8 9 19 59 20 38 
UNK 91 82 28 17 12 0 137 271 21 126 35 
Note: The unit of analysis was on a monthly basis however for the purposes to presentation the 
data was aggregated to the annual level.  
Independent Variable 
Governmental responses were categorized as one of the following responses: 
conciliation, denial, legal restriction, or violence. Unless otherwise specified, these variables 
were coded as a numeric value for the number of such actions performed in any given month. 
Each governmental response was assessed with 0-3 month lags to see if effects fluctuated 
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over time. 
Conciliation is when the government attempts to reach a compromise or political 
settlement such as offering amnesty programs, signing ceasefire agreements, or the release of 
prisoners (Amos and Stolfi 1982; Dugan and Chenoweth 2012; LaFree & Dugan, 2009; Miller, 
2007). Acts of conciliation were separated between those that targeted the group at large and 
those targeting leaders.16 For instance, the Philippines offered amnesty to members of the New 
People’s Army (NPA) in 2007. Conversely it offered protections from prosecutions for NPA 
leaders that participated in negotiations with the government. An act of conciliation was coded 
as 1 if present, and 2 if it was accompanied by a significant prisoner release.  
Denial was coded as an attempt to restrict physical movement either of supplies or 
manpower to conduct terrorist attacks. Denial consists of the use of roadblocks, curfews, or the 
installation of cameras in key locations (Adams 2003, Freedman, 2004; Heymann 2001/2002; 
Knopf, 2010, Miller, 2007, Trager & Zagorcheva, 2005/2006). While both Algeria and the 
Philippines are highly militarized countries where military or police checkpoints are a part of 
daily life, only the incidents of roadblocks as a broad regional or national policy were positively 
coded. Denial was coded as a 1 if any of the above actions took place in that given month. 
Legal restriction consists of instances when the government enacted laws or changed 
national policy to increase the state’s law enforcement abilities or restrict the media’s coverage 
of terrorism. For instance, in 2007 the Philippines enacted the Human Security Act, which allows 
the detention of suspects for three days without a warrant (BBC, 2007). Legal restriction w a s  
16	  To	  be	  considered	  a	   leader,	  the	  individual	  had	  to	  mentioned	  by	  name,	  be	  within	  the	  top	  three	  of	  the	  organization’s	  hierarchy,	  or	  listed	  as	  a	  key	  leader	  in	  its	  Terrorist	  Organization	  Profile	  (Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, 2006).	  
34	  
coded as a 1 if a law or policy took effect that strengthened its legal powers or if it declared 
emergency powers. 
Violence are instances when the government killed or captured terrorists (Davis & 
Jenkins, 2002; Kroenig & Pavel, 2012; Miller, 2007; Sandler & Siqueira, 2006; Trager & 
Zagorcheva, 2005/2006). As with conciliation, acts of violence were separated between those 
that affected group members and leaders. It was coded as a simple numeric value for the 
numbers of individuals killed or arrested in that month. 
Due to the lack of existing databases concerning governmental responses, the researcher 
constructed databases for both Algeria and the Philippines. The process was similar to the one 
used by Dugan and Chenoweth (2012). Using Textual Analysis by Augmented Replacement 
Instructions (TABARI), Dugan and Chenoweth analyzed 243,448 Reuters news articles obtained 
from Factiva after searching for “Israel” (2012).17  The resulting information was used to 
compile the Government Actions in a Terror Environment – Israel database (GATE-ISRAEL).  
To collect articles, searches were conducted for “Algeria” and “Philippines” using 
Factiva. The searches were restricted to Reuters, Agence France Presse, and the Associated 
Press. Rather than using a filter program as used by Dugan and Chenoweth (2012), the 
researcher used built-in filter options in Factiva to capture only articles that pertained to 
governmental responses to terrorism. These filters reduced the number of articles from 56,325 
and 155,497 to 4,239 (Algeria) and 17, 495 (the Philippines). For a summary of the Factiva 
filters, see Table 2: Selection Filters.
17	  Factiva	  is	  an	  online	  service	  provided	  by	  Reuters	  and	  the	  Dow	  Jones	  that	  allows	  access	  to	  thousands	  of	  sources	  from	  dozens	  of	  countries	  in	  numerous	  languages.	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Table 2: Selection Filters 
Key Word Date Source Subject Region Language 


















In order to code these articles, the process used NVivo, a text analysis program, rather 
than TABARI. While TABARI is free and highly manipulatable, it also requires programming 
experience. In contrast, NVivo is user friendly, and while it is a commercial product, many 
universities make it available at their libraries and computer labs.18 Using NVivo, the selected 
articles underwent a five stage filtering and coding process to screen for specific governmental 
responses. During stages 1-3, a search was conducted for a series of key words. Unlike many 
other programs, Nvivo allows the researcher to search for stemmed words, synonyms, or exact 
phrases.19 During stage 4, each observation was individually evaluated to ensure correct coding. 
Stage 5 corrected for duplicate observations and recorded the results in separate datasets for 
Algeria and the Philippines. Each dataset consists of categories of data pertaining to 
governmental action including offers of amnesty, arrest of terrorism suspects, the use of heavy 
weapons (artillery, air strikes), signed ceasefire agreements, denial, legal restriction, loss of 
terrorist leaders due to governmental action, referendums and/or elections, release of prisoners, 
18	  NVivo	   is	   available	   at	   the	  University	   of	   Central	   Florida	   at	   the	  Graduate	   Student	  Center,	  Coburn	  Hall,	  Suite	  146.	  	  19	  The	  quality	  of	  results	  was	  not	  uniform.	  It	  required	  trial	  and	  error	  in	  order	  to	  select	  the	  proper	  level	  of	  discrimination	  (stemmed	  words,	  synonyms,	  or	  exact	  phrases)	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and major troop movements. The collected data was in excess of the variables investigated in this 
particular research project; however, it may prove invaluable for potential future research.20  For 
a summary of the filtering process, see Table 3: Filtering Process to Obtain Governmental 
Responses.  
20	  The codebook for Government Actions in a Terrorist Environment – Israel (GATE-Israel) and 
the Measures against Extremism and Terrorism (CoMET) Database provide guidelines for key 
terms for coding. 	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Table 3: Filtering Process to Obtain Governmental Responses 





“army OR authority OR congress OR 
country defense OR defence OR 
government OR intelligence OR  law 
enforcement OR military OR nation OR 
national OR officials OR parliament OR 
police OR president OR  prime minister OR 








"militant OR militants OR extremist OR 
extremists OR fundamentalist OR 
fundamentalists OR separatist OR 
separatists OR reactionary OR reactionaries 
OR  terrorist OR terrorists OR Marxists OR 
revolutionary OR revolutionaries OR 
communist  OR communists OR Salafist 
OR Salafists OR Islamic OR Islamics OR 




"accord OR agreement OR amnesty OR 
autonomy OR cease-fire OR cease  fire OR 
compensation OR conciliation OR concord 
OR exchange OR free OR freedom OR 
leader OR negotiate OR pardon OR peace 
OR reconcile OR reconciliation OR reform 
OR released  OR referendum OR resolution 




"curfew train OR railway OR airports OR 
barriers OR deny OR defense OR defence 
OR  metal detect OR guards OR protect OR 
patrol OR reinforce OR roadblocks OR road 
blocks OR checkpoint OR roadblock OR 





"ban OR congress OR convict OR law OR 
law  enforcement OR legal OR police OR 
legislation OR parliament OR resolution    
OR restriction OR gendarme OR 






"ambush, arrest, attack, capture, clear, 
demolish, destroy, detain, fight, kill, 
massacre, raid, secure, sentence, shot, 
























 A variety of control variables were used to assess the effectiveness of governmental 
responses in the context of factors outside the control of most governments. All data for control 
variables was derived from the World Bank, Countries, and Economies (2011) unless specified. 
All economic and economic political controls are annual values and were lagged for 12 months. 
Economic development was controlled for using the change of annual GDP Growth. As a 
broad economic indicator, it may affect the support population’s assessment of future costs of 
supporting terrorism (Cederman & Girardin, 2007; Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon & Laitin, 
2003; Fearon et al., 2007; Humphreys & Weinstein, 2006; Kavanagh, 2011; Krueger & 
Maleckova, 2003). In order to increase variation, the original data was converted from annual 
data to the change of GDP growth from year to year.  
In order to control for economic freedom, the study used The Heritage Index of 
Economic Freedom, a composite score.21 Economic freedom at face value may not appear to 
contribute to political violence. But considering how the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi 
following the confiscation of his goods sparked protest across the Middle East, in what became 
known as the Arab Spring, it becomes apparent how economic freedom can potentially affect 
levels of political violence  (Al Jazeera, 2012). 
To control for changes in demographics and population density, the population (in 
100,000) and the percentage of urbanization were included. Growing populations can be more 
difficult for governments to control as well as increase the recruitment pool (Fearon et al., 2007; 
21 The overall score is derived from four main categories: “Rule of Law (property rights, freedom 
from corruption), Limited Government (fiscal freedom, government spending), Regulatory 
Efficiency (business freedom, labor freedom, monetary freedom, and Open Markets (trade 
freedom, investment freedom, financial freedom) (Heritage Index of Economic Freedom).” 
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Fearon & Laitin, 2001; Sambanis, 2007). Urbanization can potentially give terrorists increased 
mobility, communication, and access to targets. While insurgencies may benefit from rural or 
mountainous terrain, terrorism on the other hand may be better facilitated by urbanization 
(Crenshaw, 1981; Fearon et al., 2007; Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Krueger & Maleckova, 2003; 
Sambanis, 2007).  
 To control for economic impacts, the percentage of unemployed males among the male 
population was included.22 This is an important distinction since males are assumed more likely 
to participate in political violence and thus a normal unemployment rate may underestimate its 
importance (Collier & Hoeffler 2004; Fearon & Laitin 2003; Kavanagh, 2011; Krueger & 
Maleckova, 2003). The negative effects of unemployment should also be more pronounced 
among highly educated individuals as increased education raises expectations. The percentage of 
unemployed males with higher education was considered but later omitted due to data 
availability issues with Algeria.  
While the effects of political freedom are often discussed in terrorism and insurgency 
literature, both Algeria and the Philippines experienced little change in political development 
between 2000-2010. While individual scores may have changed over the course of several years, 
the overall assessments for both countries remained the same, Algeria remained an anocracy 
while the Philippines remained democratic. Political freedom was therefore excluded.  
Lastly, since both governments faced religiously inspired terrorist groups (AQIM, GIA, 
ASG, JI, MILF), it was important to control for events of Islamic significance such as Ramadan. 
22	  Due to a gap in unemployment data from Algeria, unemployment rates were averaged using 
the preceding and following years. The average unemployment rate among males was calculated 
for the years 1998, 1999, 2001, and 2002. Records from the Algeria’s Office National des 
Statuesque’s were consulted however the gaps persisted. 	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This was not initially a consideration; however, during the coding process numerous articles 
mentioned the government’s need to increase security because of the approaching holiday. 
Methods 
The assessment of governmental responses to terrorism was conducted using a Feasible 
GLS, Prais-Winsten time series regression. All the variables were tested for stationarity using the 
augmented Dickey Fuller test. In order to standardize the data, all variables were treated with 
first differencing. Another round of augmented Dickey Fuller tests were conducted to ensure the 
data was successfully rendered stationary. In instances when the results were inconclusive, a 
modified Dickey Fuller (DFGLS) test was applied. After the data was sufficiently deemed 
stationary, time series regressions were conducted. After the regressions, alternative Durbin and 
Breush-Godfrey methods tested for serial correlation. The Prais-Winsten method was used to 
correct for serial correlation. The Prais-Winsten method was selected as opposed to the 
Cochrane-Orcutt regression due to how the latter drops the initial observation. The above 
methods were applied to both Algeria and the Philippines, aggregated at the national level as 
well as for individual terrorist organizations. 
The theory is tested using three models. All models include governmental responses 
(conciliation with groups, conciliation with leaders, denial, legal restriction, violence against 
groups, and violence against leaders) and the controls (economic freedom, annual change of 
GDP, population, Ramadan, and percent of urbanization). All models include governmental 
responses between 2000-2010. All controls except for Ramadan were lagged by 12 months. 
Models 1 and 2 are restricted to overall levels of frequency and severity at national levels. Model 
1 lags governmental responses by 1 month. Model 2 lags governmental responses by 3 months. 
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This is done to isolate any temporal effects. Model 3 is far more comprehensive. In 
addition to overall levels of frequency and severity, Model 3 also investigates whether 
governmental responses have different consequences when applied to different groups. 
In Algeria, the investigation includes Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the 
Armed Islamic Groups (GIA), and unknown attackers (UNK).  In the Philippines, the 
investigation includes Abu Sayyaf (ASG), Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front (MILF), the New People's Army (NPA), and unknown attackers. 
Model 3 also includes the initial month governmental responses took place as well as 
three lags, 1 month, 2 month, and 3 month lags. 
All responses taken by a government between 2000-2010, were used for overall 
levels of frequency and severity. When investigating an individual group, only 
responses that were directed towards that specific group were used, unless specifically 
identified. For a summary of the models, see Table 4: Model Summary. All regressions 
are presented in their entirety in the appendixes. Any deviations from the models are 
acknowledged and used mainly as discussion points and not part of the formal 
regressions.  
Table 4: Model Summary
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CHAPTER FOUR: ALGERIA 
Introduction 
Using data from 2000-2010, the Algerian government’s responses to terrorism were 
assessed using time series regression. The first section of the chapter provides a brief background 
to the Algerian conflict. The results of the analysis are then presented. Models 1 and 2 will be 
discussed at the same time while focusing on areas of statistical significance.  Since Model 3 is 
far more comprehensive, it will be discussed in detail while addressing each hypothesis 
individually.
All the models include the same dependent variables, frequency and severity as well as 
the same governmental responses, and controls. Models 1 and 2 only investigate overall levels of 
frequency and severity. Model 1 includes a 1 month lag. Model 2 includes a 3 month lag. In 
contrast, Model 3 also investigates effects upon individual groups. Model 3 includes multiple 
lags to include 1, 2, and 3 month lags as well as the initial month.
Given the ten-year scope of the investigation, there was not enough observations to assess 
responses on an annual basis. However, potential long term effects, particularly those of 
conciliation and violence, are discussed in the final chapter. Discussion points, final comments, 
gaps in the theory, and potential for future research will be discussed in the final chapter.   
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Background 
For decades, violence has marred Algerian history. Algeria was colonized by France in 
1830 and remained a firm part of the French empire until the conclusion of the Second World 
War and subsequent break up of overseas European empires. From 1954 – 1962, Algeria fought 
a war of independence using both insurgency and terrorism, costing the lives of over a million 
Algerians. (BBC, 2013; Shugart, 2006). Following a military coup in 1965, Algeria emerged 
constitutionally committed to socialism with the National Liberation Front (FLN) as the sole 
inheritor of power and authority (Home Office, 2013). 
Over the next ten years, Algeria experienced relative stability, if at the expense of 
political development. Unfortunately in 1989, an experiment in democracy ended in disaster. 
After allowing increased political participation, dozens of parties contested the parliamentary 
elections in June 1991. The newly formed Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) won 188 seats in the 
first round and more success expected in the second round. Faced with potentially losing his 
majority, President Chadli dissolved the National People’s Assembly (Oberschall 2004; Home 
Office, 2013; International Crisis Group, 2001). Following his subsequent resignation, a five-
member council headed by Mohammed Boudiaf effectively ruled Algeria. The FIS was banned 
and a state of emergency declared. Despite its intended length of one year, it persisted for over 
19 years (Lowe, 2011). Later in 1996, all religious parties were banned (Home Office, 2013). 
The assassination of President Boudiaf forecasted a decade of insurgency and over twenty years 
of terrorism (International Crisis Group, 2001).  
During the first years of the conflict, the Algerian government and the FIS attempted to 
negotiate a compromise; however, the conflict quickly entered a downward spiral with increased
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levels of indiscriminate violence perpetrated by both sides. Frustrated by a lack of progress, 
many FIS supporters defected to the more radical splinter organization, the Armed Islamic Group 
(GIA). From its inception, the GIA used indiscriminate violence against civilians, particularly 
foreigners (Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, 2008). Killing civilians at fake 
checkpoints quickly became one of its favorite tactics (Reuters, 2005; AP 2009). Facing a drain 
of support, the FIS created its own armed wing, the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS) with the 
intention of creating an Islamic state under Sharia law (Memorial Institute for the Prevention of 
Terrorism, 2008).  
Since 1992, over 150,000 Algerians have been killed with both sides accusing the other 
of brutal indiscriminate violence (BBC, 2013; Home Office, 2013; Reuters, 2005). The Algerian 
government has accused the GIA of killing entire villages, while the GIA has made counter 
accusations that the massacres were attempts to discredit their legitimate political grievances 
(Cronin 2006; Renard, 2008). As the war escalated Algerian security forces were increasingly 
accused of vigilante violence, sometimes even at random, due to increased desperation and 
frustration (International Crisis Group, 2001).  
Between 1995-1998, the government began major offensives nearly destroying the AIS 
as an effective fighting force, which placed renewed pressure upon the FIS to negotiate. In 1997, 
the FIS declared a unilateral ceasefire (Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism,  
2008). In 1999, Abdelaziz Boutflika won his first Presidential elections (BBC, 2009). Following 
a series of tactical victories, Boutflika proposed an amnesty for referendum approval. In 
September 1999, a vast majority of Algerians approved the Civil Concord, an amnesty program 
for those not guilty of crimes against civilians. To the dismay of victims and their families,
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President Boutflika extended the amnesty by presidential decree to include accused terrorists, as 
long as individuals turned themselves in before January 13, 2001 (BBC, 2013; International 
Crisis Group, 2001). 
After the government promised to remove restrictions on political participation and 
release political prisoners, the AIS disbanded in January 2000. An estimated 80 percent of the 
insurgents accepted amnesty (BBC, 2013; Home Office, 2013). Between September and 
December 1999, thousands of political prisoners were released. Despite promises to extend 
political rights to all Algerians, the FIS remained banned as did its successor, the Wafa party 
(International Crisis Group, 2001).
While the amnesty neutralized thousands of insurgents and caused the dissolution of AIS, 
it had the unintended consequence of consolidating violent opposition in increasingly radical 
hands. The main beneficiaries of remaining fighters were the GIA and the Salafist Group for Call 
and Combat (GSPC), which separated from the GIA in 1998. The remaining groups share the 
same organizational and ideological linage reflecting a continued process of splintering with 
increased radicalization at every separation (Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, 
2008).  
Facing a smaller yet just as lethal terrorist threat, Algerian security forces reportedly used 
questionable methods. Things deteriorated to the extent that even news wire services commented 
on the infrequent arrests relative to the frequent deaths of terrorist suspects. According to a report 
disclosed by a government appointed committee in March 2005, security forces were responsible 
for the unlawful disappearances of over 6,000 individuals. Despite accusations of excessive 
violence, Algerian security forces continued to make tactical gains, such as the arrest of GIA
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leader Nourredine Boudiafi in January 2005. In times of increased threat levels, significant 
resources were used to establish a ring of roadblocks around Algiers, which successfully 
prevented a terrorist attack within the city for nearly two years although violence continued 
elsewhere (AFP, 2010).  
Experiencing similar tactical gains as in 1999, Boutflika once again offered an amnesty 
for approval by referendum in September 2005. An estimated 97 percent of Algerians approved a 
six-month amnesty that began in March 2006. Under the Charter for Peace and National 
Reconciliation, both rebels and security forces were pardoned. Thousands of political prisoners 
were released, including the founder of the GIA, Abdel-Haq el-Ayadia (Home Office, 2013). 
Diminished by military operations and the multiple amnesties, GIA members reportedly 
began defecting to its successor, the GSPC (Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, 
2006). It appears as though tactical and political success left a smaller yet equally lethal terrorist 
threat. After becoming the eminent terrorist threat in Algeria, the GSPC began modifying its 
targeting, tactics, and propaganda. The group increasingly targeted softer foreign commercial 
targets using explosives rather than firearms reflecting a shift from insurgency to terrorism. In 
2003, it announced its alliance with Al-Qaeda. Four years later, it officially changed its name to 
the Al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb (Memorial Institute for the Prevention of 
Terrorism, 2006; Loidolt, 2011; Render, 2008). To visualize how the frequency of GIA and 
AQIM changed, see Figure 1:  Comparing GIA and AQIM Frequencies of Terrorism.
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Figure 1:  Comparing GIA and AQIM Frequencies of Terrorism 
As seen with the recent deaths of 37 hostages in 2013 at an oil facility, a joint 
Algerian-European business venture, radical extremism remains a threat both to Algeria and 
foreign business interests in the country (CNN, 2013). However, the frequency and severity of 
attacks has been reduced significantly. The following section will use time series regression to 
attempt to assess the government’s responses. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4 provides descriptive statistics on a monthly basis from January 2000 to 













Jan 2000 Jan 2005 Jan 2010
mm_yr
Frequency - GIA Frequency - AQIM
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included. Data from September 1999 to December 1999 was excluded since it was collected to 
create lags. 
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for Governmental Responses, Algeria 
Variable Mean SD Min Max 
freq_all 4.197 3.412 0.000 20.000 
sev_all 29.470 38.529 0.000 191.000 
concil_group_all 0.076 0.293 0.000 2.000 
concil_leader_all 0.008 0.087 0.000 1.000 
denial 0.136 0.344 0.000 1.000 
legal_rest 0.015 0.123 0.000 1.000 






vio_lead_all 0.061 0.240 0.000 1.000 
freq_aqlim 1.242 1.354 0.000 7.000 
sev_aqlim 10.652 30.012 0.000 191.000 





vio_lead_aqlim 0.023 0.150 0.000 1.000 
freq_gia 0.462 1.037 0.000 6.000 
sev_gia 4.341 11.918 0.000 66.000 
vio_group_gia 2.689 11.209 0.000 110.000 G
IA
 
vio_lead_gia 0.038 0.192 0.000 1.000 
freq_unk 2.477 2.522 0.000 16.000 





vio_group_unk 10.197 21.593 0.000 149.000 
Note: The above figures only include data from 2000-2010. Data was collected to allow for lags 
between September 1999 and December 1999. Additionally, denial and legal restriction are not 
broken down by group since Algeria applied these responses equally to all groups. (n = 132). 
Overall, there were an average of 4 attacks a month, resulting in an average 29 casualties. 
AQIM averaged of 1 attack and over 10 casualties a month.23 When GSPC changed its name to 
AQIM,  it affected both its frequency and severity of attacks, reflecting changes beyond rhetoric 
but a significant increase in lethality (See Figure 2: Overall Frequency and Severity of Terrorism,
23	   AQIM	   was	   treated	   as	   the	   same	   organization	   for	   averages	   and	   regressions.	   When	  specifically	  discussing	  averages	  prior	  to	   its	  name	  change	  in	  2007,	   it	  will	  be	  referred	  to	  as	  GSPC.	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Algeria). Prior to February 2007, the GSPC averaged less than 1 attack a month, doubling to 
almost 2 attacks after becoming AQIM. The subsequent increase in severity was even more 
dramatic, increasing from an average of 3 monthly casualties to over 22 (See Table 6: Effects of 
GSPC transition to AQIM, Algeria). AQIM’s deadliest month also occurred during the same 
period. 
Figure 2: Overall Frequency and Severity of Terrorism, Algeria 
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Table 6: Effects of GSPC Transition to AQIM, Algeria 
Organization Mean SD Min Max Obs. 
GSPC - Frequency 0.8453 0.9740 0 4 85 
AQIM - Frequency 1.9787 1.6217 0 7 47 
GSPC - Severity 3.9412 9.8686 0 77 85 
AQIM - Severity 22.7872 46.4070 0 191 47 
GIA averages are underestimated as it was most active between 2000-2003, with only 
four attacks between 2004-2010. At the height of its activity, the GIA averaged 1 attack and 11 
casualties a month. Unknown perpetrators were the most active and lethal, averaging 2 attacks 
and 14 casualties a month over the 132-month period. This was only surpassed by AQIM 
following its international transition. Between 2000 and 2003, the unknown attacks were most 
likely split evenly between the GIA and GSPC. This is based on the known attacks in that same 
period.  Most of the casualties, however, were most likely caused by the GIA as it was the most 
lethal group during that time.  
Table 7: Active GIA Period, January 2000 to December 2003, Algeria 
Organization Mean SD Min Max Obs. 
GIA - Frequency 1.1875 1.4241 0 6 48 
GIA – Severity 11.5417 17.6031 0 66 48 
On average, Algerian security forces killed or arrested 18 terrorists a month during the 
132-month period. Breaking down the use of violence against groups, security forces killed or 
arrested 4 members of AQIM and 2 members of the GIA a month. Unfortunately, the articles 
often contained too little information to assign a group’s membership to an average of 10 arrests 
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or killing of terrorists a month. To see if security forces targeted specific groups more frequently 
at various periods, it is possible to analyze the averages for specific periods such the GIA most 
active period as well as the GSPC’s transition to AQIM. It appears that Algerian security forces 
targeted specific groups by their levels of lethality. During the height of the GIA’s activity, 
between 2000 and 2003, Algerian security forces killed or arrested an average of 7 members, 
dropping to less than 1 from 2004 to 2010. During the same period, security forces only killed or 
arrested an average of 2 members of GSPC; however, the use of violence dramatically increased 
to an average of 7 following the GSPC transition to AQIM. This may also reflect diminished 
support from the population, particularly if AQIM was seen as not representing the best interest 
of Algerians due to its increased internationalization. 
Table 8: Governmental Use of Violence, Algeria 
Organization Period Mean SD Min Max Obs. 
GIA - Active Jan 2000 - Dec 2003 7.2917 17.7716 0 110 48 
GIA - Inactive Dec 2003 - Dec 2010 0.0595 0.4486 0 4 84 
GSPC Jan 2000 – Dec 2003 2.3333 6.59249 0 33 48 
GSPC Jan 2000 - Feb 2007 2.9419 6.5769 0 33 86 
AQIM Feb 2007 - Dec 2010 7.6170 13.5752 0 48 47 
Results 
The results are mixed requiring an understanding of the particular circumstances in 
Algeria during the period of investigation. The results for the overall levels of frequency and 
severity at the national level as well as for specific terrorist groups were achieved using separate 
regressions. Models 1 and 2 will be discussed together while focusing on areas of statistical
significance. Frequency will be discussed first followed by severity. The regressions can also be 
found in Appendix A (Model 1 and 2). Results for Model 3 tended to have greater statistical 
significance; as a result, Model 3 will be discussed by itself while addressing individual 
hypotheses.. Model 3 will be discussed by itself while addressing individual hypotheses. In order 
to facilitate the review of multiple lags, specific results were taken from separate regressions to 
form the tables. The original regressions for Algeria can be found in Appendix C. All regressions 
used robust standard errors.  
Models 1 and 2
Frequency
The results do not show statistical support for H1A, H2A, H3A, H4A (See Table 9: 
Models 1 and 2: Effect of Gov. Responses on the Freq of Terrorism, Overall, Algeria). However, 
there was support for H1C and H4C with Model 1 and its 1 month lag. In support of H1C, 
conciliation with leaders was significant at the 1% level with a coefficient of 6.383. Algeria 
averaged 4.197 attacks a month. As a result, conciliation with leaders would increase the 
frequency of attacks by nearly 2 attacks a month.  In support of H4C, violence against leaders 
had a coefficient of -1.907 with a 10% significance level. Once again, considering that Algeria 
averaged 4.197 attacks a month, this would represent nearly a 50% reduction. 
Model 2 with a 3 month lag had results in opposition to H4A; however, the real life 
implications were minor. Violence against groups led to a decrease of -.026 attacks with a 
significance level of 5%. While in opposition to the theory, the real life effects would be marginal 
with such a small coefficient.
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Table 9: Models 1 and 2 - Frequency of Terrorism, Overall, Algeria 
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Regarding the controls, only Model 1 showed any statistical significance. 
Unexpectedly, gdp_change had a positive relationship with the frequency of terrorism. While 
counter intuitive, the results were marginal with a coefficient of .458 with a 5% significance level. 
Equally surprising, increases in population led to -2.526 with a 10% significance level. In contrast, 
Increases in urbanization had expected results, leading to an increase in frequency with a 
coefficient of 12.103 significant at the 5% level.  This is nearly 3 times the average frequency of 
attacks. 
To summarize, in support of the theory, conciliation with leaders had the unintended 
consequence of increasing the frequency of attacks with a 1 month lag. Additionally, in support of 
the theory, violence against leaders decreased the frequency of attacks with a 1 month lag. In 
opposition to the theory, violence against groups decreased the frequency of attacks with a 3 
month lag. Model 1 and Model 2 suggest conciliation can have potentially negative repercussions 
from a policy standpoint while violence can potentially reduce the frequency of terrorism.   
Models 1 and 2 
Severity
The results do not show statistical support for H1B, H2B, and H3B (See Table 10: Models 
1 and 2: Effect of Gov. Responses on the Sev of Terrorism, Overall, Algeria). However, there was 
support for H1D, H4B, and H4D with Model 1 and its 1 month lag. In support of H1D, 
conciliation with leaders was significant at the 5% level with a coefficient of 52.840. Since, 
Algeria averaged 29.470 casualties a month, this would represent nearly a 55% increase in 
casualties. In support of H4D, violence against leaders had a coefficient of -20.167 with a 10% 
significance level. Considering the average for monthly casualties, Algeria would experience a 
decrease of approximately  46% in casualties  following violence targeting terrorist leaders.    54	  
 Model 2 with a 3 month lag had results in support of H4D; however, the real life implications 
were minor. Violence against groups led to a decrease of -.352 in the number of casualties with a 
significance level of 1%. While in support of the theory, in terms of lives the reduction would be 
minor.
Regarding the controls, only Model 1 showed any statistical significance. Unexpectedly, 
gdp_change had a positive relationship with the frequency of terrorism with a coefficient of 6.539 
with a 5% significance level. Increases in population decreased casualties by -59.324 with a 10% 
significance level. This is surprising since it was assumed increases in population would strain the 
government's ability to maintain control and increase the size of the potential recruitment pool. 
Less surprisingly, increases in urbanization resulted in an increase in the severity of attacks by 
214.205 casualties. While expected since urbanization would assist terrorist mobility, an increase 
of this degree is unexpected and is most likely an outlier at least in magnitude. 
 To summarize, in support of the theory, conciliation with leaders had the unintended 
consequence of increasing the severity of attacks with a 1 month lag. In support of the theory, 
violence against leaders decreased the severity of attacks with a 1 month lag. Additionally in 
support of the theory, violence against groups decreased the severity of attacks with a 3 month 
lag. Model 1 and Model 2 suggest conciliation can have potentially negative repercussions from a 
policy standpoint while violence can potentially reduce the severity of terrorism.  
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Table 10: Models 1 and 2 - Severity of Terrorism, Overall, Algeria 
Results by Hypotheses 
Model 3
H1A: Conciliation with groups will increase the frequency of terrorist attacks during a 
four-month period. 
The results do not support H1A, acts of conciliation did not increase the frequency of 
terrorism. Table 11 presents the effects of conciliation for Algeria overall as well as the effects 
upon GIA, AQIM, and unknown perpetrators. For presentation purposes, the coefficients and 
their significance levels were gathered from separate regressions and placed on individual charts. 
The original regressions can be found in Appendix A: Regressions for Algeria. 
Table 11: Effects of Conciliation on the Frequency of Terrorism, Algeria 
Terrorist Org. Initial Month 1 Month Lag 2 Month Lag 3 Month Lag 
0.758 -4.633 2.835 1.730 
Overall (0.450) (3.980)*** (1.510) (1.290) 
0.924 -0.819 -0.026 -0.421 
AQIM (1.500) (1.820)* (0.070) (0.700) 
0.783 -0.218 0.082 0.043 
GIA (1.660)* (0.410) (0.210) (0.100) 
0.616 -2.724 1.932 1.495 
UNK (0.420) (3.60)*** (1.680)* (1.840)* 
Note: Absolute value of t-statistic in parentheses. *p ≤ .10; **p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01 (two-tailed 
tests). n = 132.  
The effect of Conciliation on the overall frequency of attacks was significant at the 1% 
level with a coefficient of -4.633 with a 1-month lag. Its negative relationship dissipates with a 2-
month lag. Following an act of conciliation, the following month saw a reduction in the 
frequency of attacks well below the monthly average of 4.1970; however, the benefits disappear 
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after a 2 and 3 month lag with coefficients of 2.835 and 1.730. The positive relationships are 
however statistically insignificant. Considering these results, while conciliation may reduce the 
frequency of terrorism over the course of 4 months; the real life implications may be marginal.  
Unexpectedly AQIM had a reduction of -0.819 with a 1-month lag at a 10% significance 
level.24  This could be explained by the GSPC’s less radical ideology in the earlier years of the 
investigation, at least relative to its later post-shift to AQIM.25 The GIA did see a slight increase 
in the initial month, however this was only significant at the 10% level. As with the overall 
frequency, the effect of conciliation on unknown perpetrators was significant at the 1% level 
with a coefficient of -2.724. However, the frequency of unknown perpetrators later increase with 
2 and 3 month lags. It appears as though, conciliation could reduce the overall frequency as well 
as the frequency from unknown perpetrators in initial month. However, due to the increases with 
2 and 3 month lags, the real life effects may be marginal. Considering these mixed results, H1A 
remains unsupported. 
H1B: Conciliation with groups will increase the severity of terrorist attacks during a four-
month period. 
As with H1A, the results show mixed results. Table 12 presents the effects of conciliation 
for Algeria overall as well as the effects upon GIA, AQIM, and unknown perpetrators. 
Conciliation decreased the severity of unknown perpetrators with a coefficient of -16.921 at the 
1% significance level with a 1-month lag.  This reduction would reduce severity from unknown 
24	   The regressions for all Algerian terrorism, AQIM, GIA, and UNK contained the same 
variable, concil_group_all because the manner in which the Algerian government offered 
conciliation, treating all terrorists equally regardless of affiliation. 	  25	  The	  GSPC,	  as	  AQIM	  was	  originally	  known	  as,	  was	  created	  in	  reaction	  to	  the	  GIA’s	  attacks	  on	  civilians.	  As	  it	  became	  more	  affiliated	  with	  al-­‐Qaeda,	  it	  too	  became	  more	  radicalized.	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perpetrators well below its average of 14.083. As with the frequency of attacks, reductions with a 
1-month lag were balanced by increases with a 2-month lag. Effects dissipated with a 3-month 
lag. Conciliation increased the overall severity as well as the severity from unknown perpetrators 
with coefficients of 28.773 and 11.153 with a 2-month lag. These effects were significant at the 
5% level. Once again, it appears as though conciliation has beneficial effects that quickly 
dissipate with the net affect canceling each other out over the course of a four-month period.  
Due to the degree of increase at the overall level over the course of 4 months, the number of 
casualties may be slightly higher. H1B finds weak support. 
Table 12: Effects of Conciliation on the Severity of Terrorism, Algeria 
Terrorist Org. Initial Month 1 Month Lag 2 Month Lag 3 Month Lag 
-8.356 -24.779 28.773 -4.974 
Overall (0.680) (1.610) (2.15)** (0.340) 
3.502 -4.953 9.029 -3.252 
AQIM (0.460) (0.690) (1.120) (0.490) 
6.413 -3.626 9.035 -2.709 
GIA (0.590) (0.360) (1.280) (0.490) 
-2.578 -16.921 11.153 1.942 
UNK (0.380) (3.080)*** (2.100)** (0.220) 
Note: Absolute value of t-statistic in parentheses. *p ≤ .10; **p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01 (two-tailed 
tests). n = 132.  
H1C: Conciliation with leaders will increase the frequency of terrorist attacks during a 
four-month period. 
The results show mild support for H1C. Table 13 presents the effects of conciliation with 
leaders on the overall frequency of attacks in Algeria, as well as the impacts upon the frequency 
of attacks conducted by the GIA, AQIM, and unknown perpetrators. The overall frequency of 
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attacks increased in the initial month with a significance level of 10%. The frequency of overall 
attacks with a 1-month lag increased considerably with a coefficient of 10.367 with a 1% 
significance level. It appears the frequency of attacks doubled from its average of 4.197 attacks 
following Conciliation with leaders. The frequency from unknown perpetrators also doubled 
beyond its average of 2.477 with a coefficient of 5.939 with a 1% significance level. The positive 
effect begins to reverse with a 2-month lag; however, the net effect for the overall frequency 
appears to be positive. This delay could be explained by the time required for leaders to gain 
control over supporters or stop attacks that were already planned. H1C finds support.   
Table 13: Effects of Conciliation with leaders on the Frequency of Terrorism, Algeria 
Terrorist Org. Initial Month 1 Month Lag 2 Month Lag 3 Month Lag 
5.630 10.367 -5.057 -3.453 
Overall (1.840)* (3.220)** (1.650)* (1.730)* 
-1.634 1.955 1.249 -.331 
AQIM (1.22) (1.49) (0.92) (0.27) 
-.697 .471 -.317 -0.94 
GIA (0.91) (0.55) (0.51) (0.15) 
1.910 5.939 -3.049 -3.886 
UNK (0.81) (2.76)*** (1.49) (2.29)** 
Note: Absolute value of t-statistic in parentheses. *p ≤ .10; **p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01 (two-tailed 
tests). n = 132.  
H1D: Conciliation with leaders will increase the severity of terrorist attacks during a four-
month period. 
The results give some support to H1D in both statical and real life terms. Table 14 
presents the effects of conciliation with leaders for the overall severity of attacks in Algeria, as 
well as the impacts upon the severity of attacks conducted by the GIA, AQIM, and unknown 
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perpetrators. Conciliation with leaders has a positive relationship with increased numbers of 
casualties at the 5% and 1% significance for the overall numbers of casualties during the initial 
month and 1-month lag with considerable coefficients of 66.749 and 95.491. It was also 
significant the 1% level for unknown terrorists with a 1-month lag as well as for AQIM at the 5% 
level with a 2-month lag. Although not significant, the trends diminish with a 3-month lag. In 
terms of actual lives lost, in the initial month, the number of casualties nearly doubled. With a 3-
month lag, it nearly triples with 56 more casualties. The increases in overall levels began to 
diminish after two months. This is a similar pattern as seen with the frequency of attacks 
following conciliation with leaders. Sharp increases followed by gradual reductions of 
decreasing magnitude.  
Table 14: Effects of Conciliation with leaders on the Severity of Terrorism, Algeria 
Terrorist Org. Initial Month 1 Month Lag 2 Month Lag 3 Month Lag 
66.749 95.491 -43.995 -10.593 
Overall (2.350)** (3.130)*** (1.740)* (0.440) 
30.944 -0.007 38.307 -22.419 
AQIM (1.410) (0.000) (2.140)** (1.750)* 
-1.996 2.166 -13.632 0.915 
GIA (0.140) (0.150) (1.400) (0.110) 
24.474 50.439 -14.423 -7.406 
UNK (1.470) (3.390)*** (1.180) (0.630) 
Note: Absolute value of t-statistic in parentheses. *p ≤ .10; **p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01 (two-tailed 
tests). n = 132.  
H2A: Denial will reduce the frequency of terrorist attacks during a four-month period. 
The results do not support H2A. Denial did not reduce the frequency of terrorism but 
rather had the opposite effect. Table 15 presents the effects of denial for Algeria overall, as well 
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as the individual impacts upon the frequency of GIA, AQIM, and unknown perpetrators. In the 
initial month, denial actually increased the overall frequency of terrorism with significance at the 
5% level and a coefficient of 2.004. The frequency of AQIM attacks with a 1-month lag had a 
similar effect with the higher significance level of 1% and a coefficient of 1.056. With an 
average overall frequency of 4.197 attacks a month, denial could raise the frequency to six 
attacks in the initial month, almost a 30 percent increase. The frequency of AQIM attacks with a 
1-month lag also increased its frequency.  
Table 15: Effects of Denial on the Frequency of Terrorism, Algeria 
Terrorist Org. Initial Month 1 Month Lag 2 Month Lag 3 Month Lag 
2.004 0.431 -0.644 -1.600 
Overall (2.070)* (0.410 (0.650) (1.400) 
-0.182 1.056 0.217 -0.421 
AQIM (0.440 (2.790)** (0.520) (0.890) 
0.323 0.243 -0.528 -0.070 
GIA (1.060 (0.790) (1.760) (0.270) 
1.208 0.550 0.133 -0.934 
UNK (1.760 (0.660) (0.190) (1.020) 
Note: Absolute value of t-statistic in parentheses. *p ≤ .10; **p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01 (two-tailed 
tests). n = 132.  
This may be explained by the nature in which denial was employed by the governments 
or by how it was coded. Denial was defined as a physical attempt to reduce terrorist mobility; it 
presented itself in the articles as roadblocks, installation of cameras, or curfews. These actions 
may be reactive rather than proactive responses to already existing terrorist attacks. For instance, 
if Algeria experienced heightened levels of terrorist attacks, the government may have responded 
with temporary roadblocks to protect sensitive sites. Even if denial successfully prevented future 
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attacks, the frequency would have appeared to increase in that month. It could also be that when 
the Algerian government received reports of possible attacks, it responded with denial forcing 
terrorists merely to switch targets while the frequency continued to rise. During heightened 
security levels, the Algerian government often created rings of roadblocks around the capital 
thereby decreasing terrorism around the capital but doing little in the periphery.   
It may also reflect the Algerian terrorist’s modus operandi, the use of fake roadblocks to 
ambush civilians and security forces. In search of funds, terrorists often used captured uniforms 
to deceive and lure their victims, rob them, and then cut their throats (AFP, 2004; Sirri, 2004). 
Unfortunately, the regular use of roadblocks without adequate identification procedures may 
actually increased the opportunity to exercise a favored tactic.    
H2B: Denial will reduce the severity of terrorist attacks during a four-month period. 
Denial had limited and contradictory effects. Table 16 presents the effects of denial for 
Algeria overall, as well as the individual impacts upon the severity of attacks conducted by GIA, 
AQIM, and unknown perpetrators. Denial had contradictory e f f ec t s  limited to the severity of 
GIA attacks. With a 2-month lag, denial decreased the severity of GIA with a coefficient of 
-6.362 at the 10% significance level. A month later it had the opposite effect with a coefficient of 
5.616 at the 10% significance level. These effects cancelled each other out. H2B remains 
unsupported.  
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Table 16: Effects of Denial on the Severity of Terrorism, Algeria 
Terrorist Org. Initial Month 1 Month Lag 2 Month Lag 3 Month Lag 
21.270 -25.673 -10.396 -6.238
Overall (0.93) (1.23) (0.89) (0.38) 
11.863 -4.421 -2.119 -9.420 
AQIM (0.85) (0.57) (0.27) (1.21) 
3.918 4.723  -6.362 5.616 
GIA (0.97) (1.23) (1.68)* (1.88)* 
*-3.347 5.298 3.972 -3.463
UNK (0.64) (0.75) (0.64) (0.44 
Note: Absolute value of t-statistic in parentheses. *p ≤ .10; **p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01 (two-tailed 
tests). n = 132.  
H3A: Legal Restriction will decrease the frequency of terrorist attacks during a four-
month period. 
The results do not support H3A. Table 17 presents the effects of legal restriction for 
Algeria overall, as well as the individual impacts upon the frequency of GIA, AQIM, and 
unknown perpetrators. It was significant for the overall level of terrorism at the 5% level with a 
coefficient of 7.292 as well as for unknown perpetrators at the 1% significance level with a 
coefficient of 7.676. Both occurred with a 2-month lag. While AQIM and GIA experienced 
decreases, they would not cancel out the dramatic increase in the overall level of terrorism. 
With monthly attack averages of 4.197 and 2.689, overall frequency of attacks increased 73 
percent while the frequency of unknown attacks increased 185 percent.  
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Table 17: Effects of Legal Restriction on the Frequency of Terrorism, Algeria 
Terrorist Org. Initial Month 1 Month Lag 2 Month Lag 3 Month Lag 
4.306 3.259 7.292 1.701 
Overall (1.760)* (1.430) (2.360)* (0.600) 
1.035 0.434 0.767 -1.784 
AQIM (1.240) (0.470) (0.900) (2.030)* 
0.051 0.419 -0.986 -1.218 
GIA (0.090) (0.660) (1.740)* (1.820) 
1.910 2.878 7.676 0.790 
UNK (1.060) (1.890)* (3.51)** (0.370) 
Note: Absolute value of t-statistic in parentheses. *p ≤ .10; **p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01 (two-tailed 
tests). n = 132.  
These results may be less surprising after considering the manner in which Algeria 
conducted its legal restriction. During the period of investigation, 2000-2010, the Algerian 
government already enjoyed considerable police powers under the 1992 state of emergency. 
When it did use legislative means to increase its powers, it usually involved restrictions on the 
media or public demonstrations. Rather than empowering authorities, these actions most likely 
only alienated the public and antagonized political opponents both terrorist and non-terrorist 
alike. The increase in unknown attacks could represent an uneasiness in opposing legal and 
relatively more legitimate means of repression. 
H3B: Legal Restriction will increase the severity of terrorist attacks during a four-month 
period. 
The results show support for H3B. Table 18 presents the effects of legal restriction for 
Algeria overall, as well as the individual impacts upon the severity of attacks conducted by the 
GIA, AQIM, and unknown perpetrators. While legal restriction had the effect of reducing the 
severity of GIA attacks with 2 and 3 month lags, any reductions were more than made up for by 
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 dramatic increases by unknown perpetrators with 1 and 2 month lags. The reductions in GIA 
attacks could be explained by attacks unattributed to the GIA by open sources. While the 
significance levels for overall levels of causalities are insignificant, the directions and 
magnitudes of the coefficient  are consistent with the theory.  
In practical terms, one month following legal restriction, there was an increase of 
approximately 9 casualties above the average of 21 casualties from unknown terrorists. After a 2- 
month lag, Algeria experienced nearly three times the number of casualties from unknown 
assailants. The effect seems to wane for unknown terrorists with a 3 month lag; while the overall 
levels continue to raise although this rise is statically insignificant. These findings serve as 
warnings that when formulating legal restrictions governments should be wary of measures that 
simply antagonize their populations rather than actually increasing the government’s ability to 
reduce terrorism levels.  
Table 18: Effects of Legal Restriction on the Severity of Terrorism, Algeria 
Terrorist Org. Initial Month 1 Month Lag 2 Month Lag 3 Month Lag 
32.538 22.632 21.315 41.433 
Overall (1.250) (1.140) (0.680) (1.380) 
11.863 -4.422 -2.119 -9.420 
AQIM (0.850) (0.570) (0.270) (1.210) 
-8.312 6.511 -14.030 -18.131 
GIA (1.490) (1.000) (1.960)* (1.930)* 
10.812 30.411 73.275 24.380 
UNK (0.710) (2.100)** (3.790)*** (1.270) 
Note: Absolute value of t-statistic in parentheses. *p ≤ .10; **p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01 (two-tailed 
tests). n = 132.  
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H4A: Violence towards groups will increase the frequency of attacks during a four-month 
period. 
The results do not support the hypothesis. Table 19 presents the effects of violence for 
Algeria overall, as well as the individual impacts upon the frequency of GIA, AQIM, and 
unknown perpetrators. The frequency of GIA attacks was reduced at the 5% significance level 
with a coefficient of -0.009 during the initial month. Violence reduced the overall frequency at 
the 1% significance level with a coefficient of -.030 with a 3-month lag. The frequency of 
unknown perpetrators was also reduced with a 3-month lag. While the hypothesis is not 
supported, the evidence is rather weak due to weak coefficients. 
Table 19: Effects of Violence towards groups on the Frequency of Terrorism, Algeria 
Terrorist Org. Initial Month 1 Month Lag 2 Month Lag 3 Month Lag 
-0.008 -0.010 0.004 -0.030 
Overall (0.800) (0.830) (0.370) (2.800)*** 
-0.014 -0.020 -0.019 0.011 
AQIM (0.840) (0.930) (0.840) (0.630) 
-0.027 0.016 0.019 -0.014 
GIA (2.39)** (1.370) (1.400) (1.270) 
-0.009 -0.005 -0.008 -0.013 
UNK (1.240) (0.490) (0.770) (1.740)* 
Note: Absolute value of t-statistic in parentheses. *p ≤ .10; **p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01 (two-tailed 
tests). n = 132.  
H4B: Violence towards groups will decrease the severity of terrorist attacks during a four-
month period.  
The results show support for H4B; however, their real life affects are minor. Table 20 
presents the effects of legal restriction for Algeria overall, as well as the individual impacts upon 
the severity of attacks conducted by the GIA, AQIM, and unknown perpetrators. Overall 
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numbers of casualties were statically significant at the 5% and 1% levels with all three lags. The 
severity of GIA attacks was also reduced at the 5% level in the initial month. Despite the 
statistical significance of both reductions, Algeria would still experience around three dozen 
casualties a month.  
Table 20: Effects of Violence towards groups on the Severity of Terrorism, Algeria 
Terrorist Org. Initial Month 1 Month Lag 2 Month Lag 3 Month Lag 
-0.094 -0.231 -0.042 -0.498 
Overall (0.560) (2.160)** (0.260) (3.810)*** 
0.439 -0.442 -0.223 -0.402 
AQIM (1.160) (1.390) (0.970) (0.950) 
-0.526 0.031 -0.075 -0.225 
GIA (3.160)*** (0.160) (0.360) (1.210) 
-0.098 -0.100 -0.148 -0.092 
UNK (1.090) (1.390) (1.910)* (1.550) 
Note: Absolute value of t-statistic in parentheses. *p ≤ .10; **p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01 (two-tailed 
tests). n = 132.  
H4C: Violence targeting leaders will decrease the frequency of terrorist attacks during a 
four-month period. 
The results show support for H4C. Table 21 presents the effects of violence targeting 
leaders for the overall frequency of attacks in Algeria, as well as the impacts upon the frequency 
of attacks conducted by the GIA, AQIM, and unknown perpetrators. Violence targeting leaders 
generally reduced terrorism. The overall frequency of attacks was most affected with a 
coefficient of -3.025 at the 5% significance level with a 1 month lag. This would reduce 
terrorism below its overall average of 4.197 attacks. The frequency of AQIM attacks was 
reduced in the initial month as well as with a 2-month lag. GIA attacks were also reduced  
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with a 1 and 2 month lag. The effects diminish after 3 months. This most likely reflects the 
government’s ability to disrupt terrorist planning and resource allocation due to leadership 
removal. 
Table 21: Effects of Violence towards leaders on the Frequency of Terrorism, Algeria 
Terrorist Org. Initial Month 1 Month Lag 2 Month Lag 3 Month Lag 
-0.001 -3.025 -1.342 -0.203 
Overall (0.000) (2.350)** (0.820) (0.200) 
-1.222 -0.460 -1.428 0.178 
AQIM (2.550)** (0.940) (2.120)** (0.200) 
-0.894 -1.316 -0.786 -0.340 
GIA (1.220) (2.11)** (1.660)* (0.640) 
1.067 -1.077 -1.124 0.643 
UNK (1.190) (1.310) (1.080) (0.840) 
Note: Absolute value of t-statistic in parentheses. *p ≤ .10; **p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01 (two-tailed 
tests). n = 132.  
H4D: Violence targeting leaders will decrease the severity of terrorist attacks during a 
four-month period.  
The results show support for H4D. Table 22 presents the effects of violence against 
leaders for the overall severity of attacks in Algeria, as well as the impacts upon the severity of 
attacks conducted by the GIA, AQIM, and unknown perpetrators. Violence against AQIM 
leaders was significant at the 5% level with a coefficient of -19.715, increasing to the 1% level 
and nearly doubles the coefficient size with a 1 month lag. Violence against GIA had a similar 
significance with far less magnitude. This could simply be reflective of the smaller average for 
GIA inflicted casualties. The effect however begins to weaken after three months, although this 
trend is statistically insignificant.  
70	  
Table 22: Effects of Violence towards leaders on the Severity of Terrorism, Algeria 
Terrorist Org. Initial Month 1 Month Lag 2 Month Lag 3 Month Lag 
30.847 -25.416 -21.122 -6.908 
Overall (1.460) (1.790) -(1.370) (0.460) 
-19.715 -40.201 -15.982 -25.112 
AQIM (2.010)* (3.020)** (1.090) (1.570) 
-7.528 -10.741 -8.473 1.200 
GIA (1.700) (2.340)** (1.840) (0.200) 
12.931 -8.427 -14.769 2.229 
UNK (0.950) (0.780) (1.800) (0.300) 
Note: Absolute value of t-statistic in parentheses. *p ≤ .10; **p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01 (two-tailed 
tests). n = 132.  
Controls 
For the most part, the majority of controls were statistically insignificant. Ramadan 
reduced the frequency of unknown perpetrators by -.925 with a 10% significance level. It also 
reduced the severity of AQIM attacks by -13.372 casualties with a 5% significance level. This is 
less then AQIM’s monthly average of 10.652. While this may seem unsurprising considering 
most Algerians are Muslims, one would expect greater reductions in the overall levels.  
An increase in urbanism was associated with a reduction in casualties from unknown 
terrorists. This relationship was significant at the 5% level with a large coefficient of -113.1502. 
This may be explained by an unexpected decrease in urbanism in the year 2000, one of the most 
violent years in the 10 year period.    
The severity of unknown perpetrators increased with increases in population. Pop_lag 
had a coefficient of 25.326 with a 10% significance level. This is approximately 10 more then 
the average for unknown perpetrators. This means that for every increase of 100,000 in 
population size, the severity of unknown attacks would increase by 10. There probably is nothing 
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special about the relationship between unknown attacks and population size. It probably reflects 
reflects the quality of open source data rather than an actual increased desire by terrorist groups 
to hide their identities. 
Unexpectedly, increases in the change of annual GDP were associated with increases in 
the frequency and severity of GIA attacks. GDP_change increased both the frequency and 
severity of GIA attacks at the 10% level with respective coefficients of .292 and 2.090. This is 
most likely explained by increases in GIA attacks during improved economic conditions in 2002 
and 2003.  
. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE PHILIPPINES 
Introduction 
The following will assess governmental responses in the Philippines. It will use a similar 
format as the preceding chapter. The first section of the chapter provides a brief background to 
the conflict. The results of the analysis will then be presented. Models 1 and 2 will be discussed 
at the same time while focusing on areas of statistical significance.  Since Model 3 is far more 
comprehensive, it will be discussed in detail while addressing each hypothesis individually.
All the models include the same dependent variables, frequency and severity as well as 
the same governmental responses, and controls. Models 1 and 2 only investigate overall levels of 
frequency and severity. Model 1 includes a 1 month lag. Model 2 includes a 3 month lag. In 
contrast, Model 3 also investigates effects upon individual groups. Model 3 includes multiple 
lags to include the initial month, 1, 2, and 3 months lags. 
Given the ten-year scope of the investigation, there was not enough observations to assess 
responses on an annual basis. However, potential long term effects, particularly those of 
conciliation and violence, are discussed in the final chapter. Discussion points, final comments, 
gaps in the theory, and potential for future research will be discussed in the final chapter.   
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Background 
In the 16th century, the Philippines become a Spanish colony. The centuries of Spanish 
colonialism had obvious political effects, deterring organic political development, but it also had 
cultural ramifications, fragmenting society (BBC, 2012; Country Profile: Philippines). Over 82 
percent of Filipinos are Roman Catholic. There is a 5 percent Muslim minority concentrated 
mainly on the southwestern portion of Mindanao Island and the southwestern archipelagos (CIA 
Factbook).  
After the Spanish American War of 1898, the Philippines entered a period of U.S. 
military rule that continued until 1935. Under the Commonwealth, the Philippines experienced 
self-rule for the first time in centuries. Following World War II, in 1946, like so many other 
colonies, the Philippines became fully independent (BBC, 2012; Rogers 2004).  
Unfortunately, independence did not mean stability or political freedom. Angered by a 
lack of land reform, the Huks, former members of the People’s Anti-Japanese Army, a wartime 
militia with a communist ideology, launched an insurgency that peaked between 1949 and 1951. 
A lack of training and arms sapped their initial momentum and within a few years, the entire 
movement dissolved (Dolan, 1991).   
Peace however did not last long. After being elected President in 1965, Ferdinand Marcos 
faced renewed opposition from communists in the north and Moro separatists in the south during 
the late 1960s. Threatened by these dual threats, in 1972, Marcos suspended Parliament and 
placed the entire country under martial law. Expanded presidential powers were established under 
a new constitution the following year (Library of Congress, 2006). Martial law was finally  lifted 
in 1981. This however did not prevent the assassination of Marcos’s main  opponent, Benigno 
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Aquino in 1983 (BBC, 2012). In 1986, the Philippines took a step towards democracy when 
mass demonstrations, diminished military support, and pressure from the Catholic church forced 
Marco’s resignation and flight to the United States. Ironically, he was replaced by Corazon 
Aquino, the widow of his former rival (BBC, 2012; Library of Congress, 2006).  
Elections did not guarantee a sense of legitimacy or stability. In 2000, President Estrada 
narrowly survived impeachment charges of corruption. Once again mass demonstrations took to 
the streets and forced the President to leave office in 2001. His vice-president, Gloria Arroyo, 
took over the presidency and won reelection in 2004 despite allegations of corruption. After 
gaining independence, corruption and cronyism have been par for the course. Since 1965, the 
Philippines have had five presidents; out of those, two have resigned, two have been arrested, 
and one has physically fled the country (BBC, 2012; Library of Congress, 2006; Dolan, 1991; 
Hedman, 2006).  
Beyond corruption, combating insurgency and terrorism face challenges inherent in the 
cultural, geographic, and political characteristics of the Philippines. Geographically, the 
Philippines is comprised of over 7,000 islands (CIA Factbook). While island geography is 
supposed to favor the counterinsurgent, this may not hold true when there are thousands of 
islands or the indigenous population has a long maritime history (Galula 1969). The traditional 
term for village or community, barangay, is actually Malay for boat and it represents a long 
history of fishing and nautical navigation. Galula also assumes the counterinsurgent has an 
adequate navy to patrol its shores. As of 2006, the Philippines had less than 70 ships with only 
half of those serviceable (Library of Congress, 2006). With 36,289 kilometers of coastline, that 
leaves 1451 kilometers per operational vessel to patrol (CIA Factbook).  
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Culturally, the Philippines remain ethnically and religiously divided. While the term 
“Moro” is derived from the Spanish term for Moors, the Moros are also ethnicially distinct. 
(Library of Congress, 2006). Moro society itself is deeply divided along ethnic and tribal lines. 
Moro communities also have the highest levels of poverty and unemployment in the Philippines 
(Jones & Morales 2012). For instance, the Basilan and Jolo provinces with Moro majorities are 
two of the worst in terms of development. Land ownership is also problematic. In Basilan, 
Muslims comprise 71 % of the population yet only own 25 % of the land (Donnelly 2004).   
Changes in traditional power structures have also left power vacuums in Moro society. 
Historically, Moro communities were led by a datu or chieftain whose power was based upon 
kinship ties and the numbers of supporters. In order to increase these numbers, villages often 
raided their neighbors (Dolan, 1991). Ironically, centralized power and the delegitimization of 
violence have eroded the traditional power structures within Moro society. Village and tribal 
leaders are no longer able to use violence to consolidate their power. The current situation 
particularly in the peripheral islands suffers from weak local leaders and an absent government. 
As a result, far too often even when leaders seek peace, they have found it almost impossible to 
control their supporters (Collier 2006).  
While there have been numerous terrorists groups in the Philippines, due to the above 
challenges, resistance from the Moro minority has been problematic. In 1972, Nur Misuari 
created the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in order to achieve an independent state for 
the Moro people. In 1976, MNLF agreed to a referendum to determine the future of the southern 
islands with Muslim minorities; however, the effort failed due to the Christian majority (Jones & 
Morales 2012; Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, 2006). Eventually, a truce was
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signed, and in 1996, the government created the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao with 
Misuari as its leader.26 While these negotiation failed to end terrorism, they did successfully split 
the Moro opposition. In 1978, after unsuccessfully challenging Misuari for MNLF leadership,  
Hashim Salamat created the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, with greater emphasis on Islam 
(Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, 2006; Rogers 2004).27  
Following military operations and the mass surrender of nearly two thousand members, 
the MILF signed peace agreements with the government in 2001 and 2003 (Banos, 2006). 
However, noncompliant members continued to conduct terrorism and associate with members of 
both ASG and JI (Hedman 2006). While, the MILF has officially renounced terrorism and 
actually conducted joint operations against ASG and JI; terrorism has continued to kill hundreds 
of individuals every year (Hedman 2006).  
In addition to the MILF, the Philippines also suffers from transnational religious 
terrorism. The ASG was formed by Abdurajak Janjalani, who was suspected of ties with Al-
Qaeda, in order to create pan-Islamic state from Mindanao to the southern portion of Thailand 
(Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, 2006; Rogers 2004). It splintered from the 
MNLF after the creation of the autonomous region. While it still verbalizes Islamic ideology, it 
has devolved into a criminal organization dependent upon ransom and extortion (James & 
Morales 2012; Rogers, 2004). In 1998, Philippine security forces killed Janjalani. With the death 
of its founder, the ASG has become increasingly decentralized. This decentralization potentially 
26	  After	  connecting	  Misuari	  to	  a	  2001	  terrorist	  attack,	  the	  government	  placed	  Misuari	  under	  house	  arrest	  (“Moro	  National	  Liberation	  Front”).	  27	  The	  MILF	  was	  originally	  called	  the	  “new	  MNLF.”	  In	  1984,	  it	  officially	  changed	  its	  name	  to	  MILF	  (Trager	  &	  Zagorchev	  2005/2006).	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limits the impact of eliminating ASG leaders (Memorial Institute for the Prevention of 
Terrorism, 2006). 
The last group, Jemaah Islamiya (JI), was created in 1993 as an Islamic terrorist group. It 
gained notoriety after the 2002 Bali bombing. Although it primarily operates in Malaysia, it also 
operates in the Philippines and has ties with renegade members of MILF and ASG. In 2003, one 
of its top leaders, Hambali, was captured by Philippine security forces (Memorial Institute for the 
Prevention of Terrorism, 2006; Jones & Morales, 2012).     
In recent years, the threat of communist terrorism, particularly from the New People’s 
Army (NPA) has eclipsed Islamic terrorism. Formed in 1969, the NPA is the armed wing of the 
Communist Party of the Philippines, Marxist-Leninist (CPP-ML). As an insurgency, it reached 
its height between 1969 and 1976 while receiving support from China. After losing its benefactor 
and a series of military defeats, the NPA has transformed into a terrorist organization that is 
increasingly associated with criminal activity. In order to weaken the government, the NPA has 
sought to dissuade foreign investments by attacking foreign companies. It also has a history of 
assassinating political opponents (Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, 2006). 
Negotiations between the government and communist factions took place in Norway in 2004. 
However, they quickly broke down due to the NPA’s insistence that the United States remove 
the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and NPA from its list of foreign terrorists 
(Hedman, 2006). In 2007, the government offered an amnesty program specifically to the 
communists without preconditions beyond individuals forgoing future terrorist activities.   
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Descriptive Statistics 
Table 23 provides the descriptive statistics for both the independent and dependent 
variables. Overall, the Philippines averaged 3.886 attacks with an average of 18.773 casualties a  
month reaching the highest levels of violence in 2003 during negiotations with the MILF (See 
Figure 3: Overall Frequency and Severity of Terrorism by, the Philippines). Overall, the MILF 
was the deadliest, averaging 1.197 attacks and 9.788 casualties a month, three more than the 
overall average. In contrast, the NPA averaged 1.114 attacks with 2.644 casualties a month. The 
casualty rate from NPA attacks is almost a quarter of that from MILF attacks. The second 
deadliest group, in terms of casualty rates per attacks, ASG, averaged .614 attacks and 6.932 
casualties a month. JI averaged only .091 attacks resulting in 1.780 casualties a month. 
Figure 3: Overall Frequency and Severity of Terrorism by, the Philippines
In terms of governmental violence, the government killed or arrested an average 25.750 
terrorists a month.  In comparison, the government used violence against the MILF an average 11 
times a month. This is nearly double the use of violence against the NPA. As was the case with 
Algeria, this probably reflects the government targeting the most lethal group, as opposed to 
potential bias against Islam (See Table 23: Descriptive Statistics for Governmental Responses, 
the Philippines).   
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Table 23: Descriptive Statistics for Governmental Responses, the Philippines 
Variable Mean SD Min Max 
freq_all 3.886 4.942 0.000 30.000 
sev_all 18.773 34.533 0.000 232.000 
concil_group_all 0.076 0.293 0.000 2.000 
concil_leader_all 0.667 0.473 0.000 1.000 
denial 0.227 0.421 0.000 1.000 
legal_rest 0.098 0.299 0.000 1.000 






vio_lead_all 0.038 0.192 0.000 1.000 
freq_abu 0.614 1.053 0.000 7.000 
sev_abu 6.932 25.090 0.000 255.000 




vio_lead_abu 0.015 0.123 0.000 1.000 
freq_ji 0.091 0.486 0.000 5.000 
sev_ji 1.780 11.751 0.000 122.000 
vio_group_ji 0.258 0.825 0.000 4.000 
JI
 
vio_lead_ji 0.015 0.123 0.000 1.000 
freq_milf 1.197 3.053 0.000 22.000 
sev_milf 9.788 29.492 0.000 229.000 
concil_group_milf 0.038 0.192 0.000 1.000 
concil_leader_milf 0.015 0.123 0.000 1.000 





vio_lead_milf 0.008 0.087 0.000 1.000 
freq_npa 1.114 1.600 0.000 9.000 
sev_npa 2.644 6.065 0.000 44.000 
concil_group_npa 0.053 0.257 0.000 2.000 





vio_group_npa 6.258 9.521 0.000 45.000 
freq_unk 1.114 1.600 0.000 9.000 





vio_group_unk 6.258 9.521 0.000 45.000 
Note: The above figures only include data from 2000-2010. Data was collected to allow for lags 
between September 1999 and December 1999. Additionally, denial and legal restriction are not 
broken down by group since Algerian applied these responses equally to all groups. (n = 132). 
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Results 
The results are mixed requiring an understanding of the particular circumstances in the 
Philippines during the period of investigation. The results for the overall levels of frequency and 
severity at the national level as well as for specific terrorist groups were achieved using separate 
regressions. Models 1 and 2 will be discussed together while focusing on areas of statistical 
significance. Frequency will be discussed first followed by severity. The regressions can also be 
found in Appendix B (Model 1 and 2). Model 3 will be discussed by itself while addressing 
individual hypotheses. In order to facilitate the review of multiple lags, specific results were 
taken from separate regressions to form the tables. The original regressions for Algeria can be 
found in Appendix D. All regressions used robust standard errors.    
Models 1 and 2 
Frequency
The results do not show statistical support for H1A, H1C, H2A, H4A, and H4C (See 
Table 24: Models 1 and 2: Effect of Gov. Responses on the Freq of Terrorism, Overall, the 
Philippines). However, there was support for H3A with Model 1 and its 1 month lag. In support 
of H3A, legal restriction was significant at the 10% level with a coefficient of -2.335. Since the 
Philippines averaged 3.886 attacks a month, legal restriction would decrease the frequency of 
attacks by 60% a month. Relative to Algeria, legal restriction in the Philippines was more 
successful most likely due to the increased detention powers provided to police forces.  
In contrast, Model 2 with a 3 month lag had opposite results. With the additional lag, legal 
restriction actually led to an increase in the frequency of attacks. With a coefficient of 2.791 
significant at the 1% level, legal restriction actually increased the frequency of attacks. This 
contradiction could be explained by terrorists adopting to the new tactical situation created by 
legal restriction. 
Regarding the controls, only ramadan showed any statistical significance in both Models 
1 and 2. Since Islamic terrorists conducted a large percentage of the terrorist attacks in the 
Philippines, Ramadan could be expected to decrease the frequency of attacks. In Model 1, 
ramadan had a negative coefficient of -1.936 and a significance level of 5%. Model 2 showed 
similar results with a negative coefficient of -1.689 and a significance level of 5%. 
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Table 24: Models 1 and 2 - Frequency of Terrorism, Overall, the Philippines 
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Models 1 and 2 
Severity
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The results do not show statistical support for H1B, H1D, H2B, H4B, and H4D (See Table 
25: Models 1 and 2: Effect of Gov. Responses on the Freq of Terrorism, Overall, the Philippines). 
Only the findings regarding legal restriction had any statistical significance. In Model 1 with a 1 
month lag, in contrast to H2B, legal restriction decreased the severity of terrorism by -14.433, 
significant at the 5% level. While in Model 2 with a 3 month lag, legal restriction had the opposite 
effect increasing the severity of terrorism by 24.364, significant at the 5% level. While supportive 
of H2B, it is problematic since the frequency also increased. It appears after 3 months, legal 
restriction led to both an increase in the frequency and the severity of terrorism. None of the 
controls were statistically significant. 
Table 25: Models 1 and 2 - Severity of Terrorism, Overall, the Philippines 
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H1A: Conciliation with groups will increase the frequency of terrorist attacks during a 
four-month period. 
The results show weak support for H1C. Table 26 presents the effects of conciliation 
with groups upon the overall frequency of attacks in the Philippines, as well as the impacts upon 
the frequency of attacks conducted by the ASG, JI, MILF, NPA, and unknown perpetrators.28 
Regressions for the Philippines in their entirety can be found in Appendix B: Regressions for the 
Philippines.  
Conciliation had a positive relationship with the overall frequency of terrorism in the 
initial month with a significance level of 5% and a coefficient of 3.068. If this increase is added 
to the average number of overall attacks, the Philippines would experience approximately 7 
attacks in a month, nearly twice as much as the monthly average. The frequency of unknown 
perpetrators also increased with a coefficient of .734 with a 10% significance level. These effects 
however dissipated in significance levels with any lag.   
28
 The Philippine government did not negotiate with ASG or JI. However, it reached several deals  
with  the  MILF.  One  of  the  major  goals  of  these  agreements  was  to  increase  
cooperation between the government and the MILF to reduce ASG and JI attacks. For this reason, 
agreements with the MILF were also included in the regressions for ASG and JI.
Results by Hypotheses 
Model 3
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Table 26: Effects of Conciliation on the Frequency of Terrorism, the Philippines 
Terrorist Org. Initial Month 1 Month Lag 2 Month Lag 3 Month Lag 
3.068 1.069 1.002 0.331 
Overall (2.510)** (1.010) (1.060) (0.420) 
0.549 0.104 0.852 1.168 
ASG (1.020) (0.180) (1.030) (1.270) 
0.034 -0.013 0.145 0.002 
JI (0.430) (0.100) (1.520) (0.020) 
2.689 0.598 1.262 -0.330 
MILF (1.200) (0.540) (1.120) (0.46) 
0.101 0.738 0.360 -0.108 
NPA (0.160) (1.110) (0.840) (0.280) 
0.734 -0.224 -0.705 -0.064 
UNK (1.770)* (0.510) (1.480) (0.140) 
Note: Absolute value of t-statistic in parentheses. *p ≤ .10; **p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01 (two-tailed 
tests). n = 132.  
The lack of strong positive or negative effects of conciliation is surprising. It may reflect 
the manner in which the Philippines conducted conciliation, particularly in regards to the NPA. 
When the Philippines offered amnesty to the NPA in 2007, its terms were less defined. Unlike 
the 6 month window offered by the Algerian government, the Philippine government placed no 
such time constraints. Perhaps this explains why it had such little effects in the following 
months. From the perspective of the NPA, conciliation probably lacked political incentives, such 
as land redistribution.  
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H1B: Conciliation with groups will increase the severity of terrorist attacks during a four-
month period. 
The results find extremely weak support for H1B. Table 27 presents the effects of 
conciliation with groups upon the overall severity of attacks in the Philippines, as well as the 
impacts upon the severity of attacks conducted by the ASG, JI, MILF, NPA, and unknown 
perpetrators. Conciliation with the MILF led to an increase in JI severity. With a coefficient of 
4.223 at the 10% level with a 2 month lag, this is nearly double the number of casualties. This 
could reflect JI attempts to spoil MILF negotiations with the government. Unfortunately, 
conciliation’s effects on the overall levels of severity were statistically insignificant.  
Table 27: Effects of Conciliation on the Severity of Terrorism, the Philippines 
Terrorist Org. Initial Month 1 Month Lag 2 Month Lag 3 Month Lag 
11.58266 7.650972 13.83424 6.75842 
Overall (0.95) (0.75) (1.38) (0.95) 
21.16331 -.7368992 11.84599 41.16816 
ASG (1.45) (0.05) (0.54) (1.45) 
.6538745 2.423996 4.22324 2.07706 
JI (0.34) (0.70) (1.92)* (1.09  ) 
7.633843 -2.674646 13.36519 -1.29865 
MILF (0.73) (0.22) (1.04) (0.20) 
-.1725718  .6295496 -2.10274  -1.412804 
NPA (0.10) (0.41) (1.62) (1.14) 
.2196835  4.933534 -4.204489 3.235764 
UNK (0.03) (0.78) (0.75) (0.67) 
Note: Absolute value of t-statistic in parentheses. *p ≤ .10; **p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01 (two-tailed 
tests). n = 132.  
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H1C: Conciliation with leaders will result in an increase in the frequency of terrorist 
attacks during a four-month period to a greater extent then conciliation with groups. 
The results do not support H1C. Table 28 presents the effects of conciliation with leaders 
upon the overall frequency of attacks in the Philippines, as well as the impacts upon the 
frequency of attacks conducted by the ASG, JI, MILF, NPA, and unknown perpetrators. 
Contrary to the theory as well as the Algerian results, conciliation with leaders resulted in 
reductions in the overall frequency as well as the frequency of ASG and NPA attacks. The 
frequency of overall attacks was below its average of 3.886 with a 2-month lag and significant at 
the 5% level. While the frequency of NPA attacks was also below it’s average of 1.14 with a 3- 
month lag and 5% significance level. This is particularly surprising since the effects are even 
greater than conciliation with groups however they are delayed until the 2 and 3 month lags. 
Perhaps Philippine terrorist leaders were more willing than their followers to negotiate, and it 
took several months before they could gain control over their followers.  
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Table 28: Effects of Conciliation towards leaders on the Frequency of Terrorism, the Philippines 
Terrorist Org. Initial Month 1 Month Lag 2 Month Lag 3 Month Lag 
0.946 3.246 -4.203 1.516 
Overall (0.410) (1.570) (2.060)** (0.500) 
-0.254 -0.763 -0.763 0.093 
ASG (0.590) (1.710)* (1.010) (0.190) 
0.152 -0.338 -0.036 -0.089 
JI (0.990) (1.270) (0.310) (0.610) 
2.237 1.527 -2.798 1.976 
MILF (1.370) (0.920) (1.080) (0.870) 
0.882 1.002 -1.271 -2.704 
NPA (0.830) (0.700) (1.570) (2.160)** 
-0.666 2.304 -0.822 -1.960 
UNK (0.490) (1.550) (0.830) (1.580) 
Note: Absolute value of t-statistic in parentheses. *p ≤ .10; **p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01 (two-tailed 
tests). n = 132.  
H1D: Conciliation with leaders will increase in the severity of terrorist attacks during a 
four-month period to a greater extent then conciliation with groups. 
The results regarding H4C are mixed. Table 29 presents the effects of conciliation with 
leaders upon the overall severity of attacks in the Philippines, as well as the impacts upon the 
severity of attacks conducted by the ASG, JI, MILF, NPA, and unknown perpetrators. Initially, 
conciliation with leaders led to increases in the severity of attacks for both the Philippines overall 
and unknown perpetrators at the 5% and 1% levels. This however was countered by decreases in 
overall levels and the severity of NPA attacks at the 5% and 1% levels at 2 and 3 month lags, 
respectively.   
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Table 29: Effects of Conciliation with leaders on the Severity of Terrorism, the Philippines 
Terrorist Org. Initial Month 1 Month Lag 2 Month Lag 3 Month Lag 
11.407 16.810 -26.326 -3.793 
Overall (0.810) (2.020)* (2.53)* (0.210) 
0.271 -0.548 1.853 -0.965 
ASG (0.030) (0.060) (0.160) (0.080) 
3.163 -7.640 0.011 -2.148 
JI (0.890) (1.120) (0.000) (0.670) 
-3.153 3.597 -35.886 -23.927 
MILF (0.260) (0.230) (1.730) (1.290) 
-1.924 1.782 0.733 -10.575 
NPA (0.300) (0.480) (0.140) (2.500)** 
6.863 5.795 -4.499 -3.646 
UNK (2.540)* (2.380)* (0.960) (0.440) 
Note: Absolute value of t-statistic in parentheses. *p ≤ .10; **p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01 (two-tailed 
tests). n = 132.  
H2A: Denial will reduce the frequency of terrorist attacks during a four-month period. 
The results do not support H2A. Table 30 presents the effects of denial upon the overall 
frequency in Philippines, as well as the impacts upon the frequency of attacks conducted by the 
ASG, JI, MILF, NPA, and unknown perpetrators. As with Algeria, denial failed to reduce the 
frequency of terrorism specifically the frequency of MILF attacks. Both the overall and MILF 
frequency were significant at the 5% level with coefficients of 2.33 and 1.016. The increased 
frequency of MILF attacks continued to the 2-month lag with a similar significance level and 
coefficient. It was not until the third lag that any reduction occurred, and this was restricted to 
the NPA with only a 10% level and a low magnitude.   
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Table 30: Effects of Denial on the Frequency of Terrorism, the Philippine
Terrorist Org. Initial Month 1 Month Lag 2 Month Lag 3 Month Lag 
2.133 1.130 -0.605 -1.317 
Overall (2.460)** (1.200) (0.510) (1.160) 
0.370 -0.540 -0.169 0.078 
ASG (1.170) (1.580) (0.600) (0.320) 
-0.066 -0.069 -0.082 0.302 
JI (0.660) (0.560) (0.540) (1.440) 
1.016 1.138 0.054 -0.176 
MILF (2.510)** (2.660)** (0.130) (0.480) 
0.510 -0.250 -0.317 -0.769 
NPA (1.420) (0.740) (0.640) (1.790)* 
0.679 0.474 -0.645 -0.253 
UNK (1.280) (0.850) (0.950) (0.360) 
Note: Absolute value of t-statistic in parentheses. *p ≤ .10; **p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01 (two-tailed 
tests). n = 132.  
H2B: Denial will increase the severity of terrorist attacks during a four-month period. 
The results weakly support H2B. Table 31 presents the effects of denial upon the overall 
severity of attacks in the Philippines, as well as the impacts upon the severity of attacks 
conducted by the ASG, JI, MILF, NPA, and unknown perpetrators. Denial increased the severity 
at the 10% percent significance level with a coefficient of 12.105. Had it achieved a higher 
significance level, it would have supported the hypothesis that denial could increase the number 
of causalities due to increased planning and resource allocation due to a reduction in targets.   
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Table 31: Effects of Denial on the Severity of Terrorism, the Philippines 
Terrorist Org. Initial Month 1 Month Lag 2 Month Lag 3 Month Lag 
12.10541 2.663095 -5.632643 -4.793846 
Overall (1.93)* (0.52) (-0.91) (-0.72) 
5.749192 -8.695357 .5151115 -2.238578 
ASG (0.63) (1.18) (0.09) (0.39) 
-.74404 .6416379 -.2083897 6.983289 
JI (0.35) (0.22) (0.05) (1.33) 
8.277825 4.994665 1.077757 -1.739772 
MILF (1.66)* (1.47) (0.31) (0.52) 
3.413438 .6136982  -1.069416 -.7520658 
NPA (1.55) (0.36) (0.71) (0.40) 
1.118812 -1.996175 -7.589275 -4.256952 
UNK (0.36) (0.57) (1.65) (0.79) 
Note: Absolute value of t-statistic in parentheses. *p ≤ .10; **p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01 (two-tailed 
tests). n = 132.  
H3A: Legal Restriction will decrease the frequency of terrorist attacks during a four-
month period. 
The results show weak support for H3A. Table 32 presents the effects of legal restriction 
upon the overall frequency of attacks in the Philippines, as well as the impacts upon the 
frequency of attacks conducted by the ASG, JI, MILF, NPA, and unknown perpetrators. Legal 
restriction reduced the overall frequency with a coefficient of -2.759 at the 10% significance 
level. It also reduced MILF attacks with a coefficient of -1.680 at the 1% significance level. This 
could potentially reduce MILF attacks below its monthly average of 1.197. This could reflect the 
increased detention powers provided by the  Human Security Act of 2007; however, if this were 
the case, one would expect similar reductions regardless of lags (BBC, 2007).  
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Table 32: Effects of Legal Restriction on the Frequency of Terrorism, the Philippines 
Terrorist Org. Initial Month 1 Month Lag 2 Month Lag 3 Month Lag 
1.241 -2.759 1.610 1.633 
Overall (0.840) (1.780)* (0.880) (1.100) 
-0.437 0.296 -0.152 -0.278 
ASG (1.070) (0.650) (0.380) (0.680) 
0.023 0.127 -0.138 -0.071 
JI (0.240) (1.150) (1.320) (0.620) 
0.415 -1.680 0.269 0.051 
MILF (0.700) (2.650)*** (0.550) (0.090) 
-0.170 -0.259 0.502 0.950 
NPA (0.370) (0.370) (0.670) (1.690) 
0.137 -0.600 0.114 0.600 
UNK (0.210) (0.880) (0.140) (0.990) 
Note: Absolute value of t-statistic in parentheses. *p ≤ .10; **p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01 (two-tailed 
tests). n = 132.  
H3B: Legal Restriction will increase the severity of terrorist attacks during a four-month 
period. 
The results are mixed but the net effects seem not to support H3B. Table 33 presents the 
effects of legal restriction upon the overall severity of attacks in the Philippines, as well as the 
impacts upon the severity of attacks conducted by the ASG, JI, MILF, NPA, and unknown 
perpetrators. Legal restriction led to an increase in the severity of MIF attacks with a 2-month 
lag. The coefficient was 8.790 with a 10% significance level. Although, a positive relationship 
exists legal restriction would not increase the severity of MILF attacks beyond its monthly 
average of 9.788. The severity of NPA attacks initially decreased with a coefficient of -3.971 
with a 10% significance level. However, with a 3-month lag it increased with a coefficient of 
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2.994 also at the 10% significance level. Considering the net effect over the course of 4 months it 
appears legal restriction increased the severity of attacks but only slightly.  
Table 33: Effects of Legal Restriction on the Severity of Terrorism, the Philippines 
Terrorist Org. Initial Month 1 Month Lag 2 Month Lag 3 Month Lag 
9.293258 -10.77486 8.962269 12.75379 
Overall (1.27) (1.46) (1.25) (1.25) 
-.1100235 6.789067 .9668076 -13.29077 
ASG (0.01) ( 0.73) (0.15) (1.57) 
-.9733923 1.58769 -3.903893 -.1416185 
JI (0.41) (0.56) (1.43) (0.04) 
 5.192356 -7.163538 8.790237 .6396101 
MILF (1.26) (1.52) (1.79)* (0.15) 
-3.971874 -3.417256 .4403843 2.993559 
NPA (1.82)* (1.64) (0.24) (1.67)* 
1.333786 .1964706 -1.727179  10.61692  
UNK (0.30) (0.04) (0.35) (1.28) 
Note: Absolute value of t-statistic in parentheses. *p ≤ .10; **p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01 (two-tailed 
tests). n = 132.  
H4A: Violence towards groups will increase the frequency of attacks during a four-month 
period.  
The results weakly support H4A. Table 34 presents the effects of violence with groups 
upon the overall frequency of attacks in the Philippines, as well as the impacts upon the 
frequency of attacks conducted by the ASG, JI, MILF, NPA, and unknown perpetrators. The 
positive relationship between violence and the overall frequency occurred in the initial month 
with multiple significance levels at the 1%, dropping to the 5% level with a 1-month lag. 
Regardless of the significance levels, the coefficients are low, never raising above .582. While 
violence did result 
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in frequency increases, it does so in a weak manner, with averages barely above its norm of 
3.886 attacks a month.  
Table 34: Effects of Violence towards groups on the Frequency of Terrorism, the Philippines 
Terrorist Org. Initial Month 1 Month Lag 2 Month Lag 3 Month Lag 
0.582 0.023 0.011 0.007 
Overall (5.880)*** (2.490)** (0.110) (0.850) 
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 
ASG (0.740) (0.710) (0.740) (0.420) 
0.038 0.011 -0.058 0.007 
JI (1.030) (0.300) (1.520) (0.230) 
0.059 0.019 0.002 -0.004 
MILF (5.270)** (2.250)** (0.240) (0.780) 
0.039 0.024 0.027 0.031 
NPA (2.270)** (1.230) (1.210) (1.450) 
0.008 0.004 0.004 0.003 
UNK (2.180)** (1.150) (1.040) (0.590) 
Note: Absolute value of t-statistic in parentheses. *p ≤ .10; **p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01 (two-tailed 
tests). n = 132.  
H4B: Violence towards groups will decrease the severity of terrorist attacks during a four-
month period.  
The results do not support H4B. Table 35 presents the effects of violence with groups 
upon the overall severity of casualties in Philippines, as well as the impacts upon the severity of 
attacks conducted by the ASG, JI, MILF, NPA, and unknown perpetrators. Violence against 
groups  resulted in increases in the severity of overall levels with significance levels of 5% in the 
initial month as well as with the 2-month lag. The severity of from MILF and unknown attacks 
also increased in the initial month while the severity of NPA attacks did not increase until the 
third lag. As with violence’s effect on the frequency of attacks, the coefficients are weak with 
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none rising above .358.  While contrary to the theory, in terms of life and death the effects are 
barely noticeable.  
Table 35: Effects of Violence towards groups on the Severity of Terrorism, the Philippines 
Terrorist Org. Initial Month 1 Month Lag 2 Month Lag 3 Month Lag 
0.325 0.075 0.261 0.022 
Overall (3.510)** (0.700) (3.290)** (0.280) 
0.082 0.057 0.025 0.004 
ASG (1.130) (0.880) (0.350) (0.070) 
0.775 0.240 -1.395 0.745 
JI (0.960) (0.320) (1.420) (1.060) 
0.358 0.089 0.173 0.035 
MILF (2.660)** (0.540) (1.620) (0.390) 
0.049 0.023 0.036 0.196 
NPA (0.720) (0.370) (0.360) (1.990)* 
0.086 -0.006 0.105 -0.025 
UNK (1.920)* (0.150) (1.740)* (0.520) 
 Note: Absolute value of t-statistic in parentheses. *p ≤ .10; **p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01 (two-tailed 
tests). n = 132.  
H4C: Violence targeting leaders will decrease the frequency of terrorist attacks during a 
four-month period.  
The results show very weak support for H4C. Table 36 presents the effects of violence 
targeting leaders upon the overall frequency of attacks in the Philippines, as well as the impacts 
upon the frequency of attacks conducted by the ASG, JI, MILF, NPA, and unknown perpetrators. 
Violence against leaders reduced the overall frequency of attacks with a 2-month lag with a 
coefficient of -2.916 with a 10% significance level. It also reduced the frequency of JI attacks 
with coefficients of -0.555 and -0.693 with 1 and 3 month lags. Although t he reductions are 
slight, it is below JI’s month average of .091. The frequency of MILF attacks with a 1-month lag 
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actually increased. Due to mixed results, with strong reductions occurring only after two months, 
the hypothesis has weak support.  
Table 36: Effects of Violence towards leaders on the Frequency of Terrorism, the Philippines 
Terrorist Org. Initial Month 1 Month Lag 2 Month Lag 3 Month Lag 
1.171 -0.032 -2.916 -2.111 
Overall (0.820) (0.020) (1.650)* (1.440) 
-0.404 0.126 -1.004 -0.434 
ASG (0.710) (0.210) (1.590) (0.750) 
0.161 -0.555 -0.199 -0.693 
JI (1.120) (1.680)* (0.780) (2.080)** 
-0.176 1.318 0.720 -1.026 
MILF (0.290) (1.820)* (0.990) (1.620) 
n/a n/a n/a n/a 
NPA29 
0.482 -0.576 -1.283 -1.224 
UNK (0.520) (0.570) (1.040) (1.090) 
Note: Absolute value of t-statistic in parentheses. *p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01 (two-tailed tests). 
n = 132.  
H4D: Violence targeting leaders will decrease the severity of terrorist attacks during a 
four-month period.  
The results weakly support H4D. Table 37 presents the effects of violence targeting 
leaders upon the overall severity of attacks in the Philippines, as well as the impacts upon the 
severity of attacks conducted by the ASG, JI, MILF, NPA, and unknown perpetrators. Violence 
against leaders reduced the severity of JI attacks with all three lags with  significance levels of 
10% and 5% levels.  The coefficients ranged from -15.510 to -20.266. The number of casualties 
29	  The	  Philippine	  government	  did	  not	  kill	  or	  capture	  NPA	  leaders	  that	  were	  senior	  enough	  to	  be	  scored.	  	  
99	  
from JI was significantly less then its average of 1.780. ASG severity was also reduced with a 
coefficient of -15.510 with a 10% significance level. This too was below its average of 6.932. 
These results suggest that the effects of violence against leaders were magnified when it was 
against smaller groups. Perhaps the larger organizations were able to successfully absorb these 
losses with established succession lines.  
Table 37: Effects of Violence towards leaders on the Severity of Terrorism, the Philippines 
Terrorist Org. Initial Month 1 Month Lag 2 Month Lag 3 Month Lag 
8.908 3.102 -17.227 -3.653 
Overall (0.890) (0.240) (1.190) (0.230) 
-5.701 0.434 -15.072 -3.834 
ASG (0.570) (0.040) (1.920)* (0.680) 
-9.146 -19.396 -15.510 -20.266 
JI (1.370) (2.280)** (1.860)* (1.930)* 
-3.911 7.152 1.317 -5.521 
MILF (0.590) (0.740) (0.200) (0.990) 
n/a n/a n/a n/a 
NPA 
5.961 1.603 -17.258 -9.544 
UNK (0.730) (0.150) (1.450) (0.700) 
Note: Absolute value of t-statistic in parentheses. *p ≤ .10; **p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01 (two-tailed 
tests). n = 132.  
Controls 
For the most part, the controls were statically insignificant with patterns of similar to 
Algeria. As can be expected given the Islamic natures of many of the terrorist groups, Ramadan 
tended to reduce the frequency of terrorism. However, the reductions tended to be weak. 
Ramadan reduced the frequency of ASG with a -.7633051 at the 5% significance level. 
Surprisingly the largest reduction occurred in the frequency of NPA attacks, a communist non-
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religiously inspired group. Ramadan actually had the opposite effect on JI, leading to an increase 
with a coefficient of .188 with a 10% significance level. While seemingly small, the effect is 
actually larger considering the low frequency average  for JI.  This could be explained by it being 
largely an international group and therefore less susceptible to public opinion.  
Ramadan also tended to reduce the servity of attacks, although it was not universal. There 
were reductions in the overall number of casualties however it was statically insignificant.  Once 
again, there was a reduction in the severity of NPA attacks significant at the 1% level with a 
coefficient of -4.249, far below its average of 2.644. Interestingly enough, the severity of attacks 
only increased with JI and unknown perpetrators. The rise in casualties from unknown 
perpetrators was significant at the 5% level with a coefficient of 9.418. This is nearly a 400% 
increase. While it could be merely reflect the poor quality of open source information, the rise in 
casualties from unknown perpetrators most likely stems from terrorist not wishing to be 
portrayed as “unIslamic” during a holy holiday.  
Economic freedom seemed to reduce the frequency and severity of JI attacks at the 5% 
and 1% levels with the largest coefficient of -7.700, far below its average of 1.780. It had the 
opposite effect upon the severity of NPA attacks resulting in a coefficient of 2.169 at the 5% 
significance level.  
The frequency and severity of JI attacks was also positively affected by increases in 
urbanism at the 5% level with coefficients of 7.735 and 163.003. These finding should however 
be viewed with some skepticism considering the overall levels of frequency and severity were 
not affected.  One would expect the overall trends to be more affected by these very broad 
variables.  
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Increases in population size were associated with increases in severity from unknown 
perpetrators. The increase occurred with a 5% significance level with a coefficient of .762 
reflecting a small increase with every population increase of 100,000. Curiously, increases in 
population had an opposite effect upon JI, with negative coefficient of -0.037 at the 10% level. 
These effects, however, can probably be discarded considering population factors should have 
affected the overall trends of frequency and severity.     
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION 
Models 1 and 2 had limited statistical significance. In the context of Algeria, Model 1 
with a 1 month lag suggests conciliation with leaders can have the unintended consequence of 
actually increases both the frequency and severity of terrorism. Violence against leaders 
decreased both the frequency and severity. In Model 2 with a 3 month lag suggests violence 
against groups can potentially reduce frequency and severity of terrorism; however, with limited 
real world significance  due to small coefficients.   
In the Philippines, the only variable with any statistical significance was legal restriction. 
Model 1 showed that legal restriction can potentially reduce the frequency and severity; however, 
the benefits disappeared after using Model 2 with a 3 month lag. This suggests terrorists were 
able to adapt to the increased detention powers provided by the Human Security Act of 2007.
Discussion: Model 1 and 2 
Models 1 and 2 will be discussed first, followed by Model 3. Most of the discussion will 
be devoted to Model 3, considering its increased statistical significance as well as its more 
comprehensive nature. Each response will be discussed in the context of each case. Although the 
unit of analysis for the regressions was monthly, potential long term effects will be discussed 
using aggregated annual data. The thesis will conclude with final remarks including potential 
improvements to the design as well as topics for future research. 
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Discussion: Model 3 
Conciliation 
 In the context of Algeria, conciliation with groups reduced the frequency and severity of 
terrorism. These findings consistently appeared with a 1-month lag, suggesting their affects begin 
to wane with time. However, they also show that conciliation with leaders without offering 
incentives to the larger membership can create moral hazard resulting in increases in both 
frequency and severity of terrorism. After two months, the positive relationship between 
conciliation with leaders and the frequency and severity of terrorism began to diminish 
suggesting perhaps either the leaders began to consider the benefits of conciliation or they 
suffered from diminished resources after expending them in the first two months, although the 
attacks never decreased below their historical averages.  
In contrast, conciliation with groups in the Philippines increased attacks, although due to 
rather small coefficients the real life impacts are marginal. Conciliation with leaders had mixed 
results often leading to decreases in the overall frequency as well as the severity of attacks only 
after two months. There are several potential explanations. Attacks that were already planned 
may have simply continued due to the decentralized nature of their communication lines. Or it 
may have taken leaders two months to gain control of their supporters. Unexplainablly, 
conciliation with NPA leaders took even longer to take effect. This may reflect a more 
decentralized command structure although this is speculation without further evidence.  
The discrepancy between Algeria and the Philippines may be explained by the reluctance 
of Algerian terrorist leaders to begin a genuine peace process. Facing certain destruction from 
military action, these leaders may have been seeking a respite from governmental attack. These
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findings suggest concessions such as amnesty may fail if they merely decriminalize terrorism 
without addressing grievances.  
From a theoretical standpoint, there are several implications. The research appears to 
support the findings of Bueno de Mesquita (2005), Crenshaw (1981), Gurr (1998), and Kydd & 
Walter (2006). Conciliation often led to increases in both the frequency and severity of terrorism 
at least initially. It also challenges Dugan & Chenoweth’s assertion that conciliation reduces 
terrorism in the short term (2012). The research suggests governments should take into account 
the internal characteristics of groups when weighing the cost of conciliation. In order for 
conciliation to benefit the government, terrorist leaders must be willing and capable to control 
their members. This supports the argument posed by Bar (2012) when he suggested deterrence 
was a feasible policy when dealing with highly centralized organizations such as Hezbollah.   
Denial 
For both Algeria and the Philippines, denial failed to reduce the frequency of attacks. 
Contrary to H3B, denial did occasionally reduce the severity of attacks in the Philippines. 
Perhaps denial caused terrorist to adjust to less favorable targets, although they attacked just as 
frequently. This appears to support the findings of Enders & Sandler (1993). Their research 
found increased airport security merely forced terrorists to switch to other tactics such as 
assassination.  
The manner in which denial manifested itself in the coding process could also skew these 
results. The use of roadblocks and other security measure during heighted security levels, 
particularly during the initial month, may lead to perceived increases. Because roadblocks were
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the most often manifestation of denial, this could reflect reactive governmental responses to 
terrorists attacks that had already taken place within that month. That may explain why denial 
did not reduce the frequency of attacks as expected by the theory. 
Legal Restriction 
Legal restriction had mixed effects. In Algeria, legal restriction did not reduce the 
frequency of attacks, but as expected, it increased the severity of attacks. In Algeria, this 
probably reflects the already expansive police powers enjoyed by the state following the 
emergency of 1992. The policy was slightly more successful in the Philippines. In accordance 
with the theory, legal restriction reduced the frequency of attacks.  Unexpectedly, it also reduced 
the severity of attacks. In contrast to Algerian legal restriction, the Philippine anti-terrorist law 
(Human Security Act of 1992) expanded police detention powers. Rather than simply antagonize 
the population, the law actually increased the government’s power.  
Violence 
In Algeria, violence against groups did not result in increased reprisal attacks as 
expected. In contrast, the Philippines did see increases in frequency as expected by the theory. 
This discrepancy could be explained by the differing terrain. In Algeria a large number of 
operations took place in remote mountainous regions. Perhaps this allowed the Algerian 
government to isolate its targets. Terrorists in the Philippines may have been more dispersed 
across the many archipelagos. This difficulty was only compounded by the Philippines lacking 
an adequate navy. Despite Galula’s predictions, the island geography, in this case, appears to 
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have favored the terrorist (1963). The findings suggest that in the short term, violence against 
leaders rather than whole groups appears to be the most effective means to reduce the frequency 
and severity of terrorism. This challenges Dugan & Chenoweth’s assertion that repression is 
associated with increases in terrorism (2012). In a broader sense, it also challenges much of the 
literature that underrates violence, particularly violence against leaders, as a viable policy option. 
Governments should focus on gathering viable information concerning terrorist organizations 
and use that information to selectively target leaders in a manner that limits civilian casualties. 
By doing so, conciliation may potentially create a public good from decreased levels of 
terrorism, while the use of violence potentially serves as a deterrent.
Long Term Effects 
Algeria 
In 2000 and 2006, Algeria offered conciliation in the form of amnesty programs. 
Between 2000 and 2002, Algeria experienced increases in both frequency and severity. 
However, to disregard the benefits of conciliation would be premature. It may be that 
conciliation merely took longer to take effect. By 2003, Algeria experienced a 48 percent 
reduction in frequency and a 52% reduction in severity (See Table 38: Frequency and Severity of 
Terrorism, Algeria). Similarly, by 2009, the frequency of attacks dropped 56% while the severity 
dropped 7%. The minor drop in severity is probably explained by the dramatic increase in the 
severity of AQIM attacks. Although the frequency of AQIM dropped nearly 60%, its severity 
rose 45%. This could reflect an increased detachment from Algerian casualties due to a more 
international focus. Training and planning procedures may have also improved due to its new 
relationship with al-Qaeda.   
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Table 38: Frequency and Severity of Terrorism, Algeria 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Case 
Freq Freq Freq Freq Freq Freq Freq Freq Freq Freq Freq 
Algeria 79 84 87 49 29 36 61 52 43 27 15 
AQIM 9 10 8 20 12 15 29 33 18 11 4 
GIA 8 15 24 10 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 
UNK 60 58 54 19 17 19 32 19 25 16 10 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Case 
Sev Sev Sev Sev Sev Sev Sev Sev Sev Sev Sev 
Algeria 520 680 679 253 184 155 202 626 295 189 71 
AQIM 31 45 27 123 29 69 108 583 226 157 33 
GIA 80 118 283 73 8 11 0 0 0 0 0 
UNK 401 516 364 57 147 75 94 43 69 32 36 
Note: The unit of analysis was on a monthly basis however for the purposes to presentation the 
data was aggregated to the annual level.  
Following multiple amnesties, as well as a series of operations that successfully 
eliminated numerous leaders, the GIA disintegrated only to have its members join more radical 
groups such as AQIM. Although smaller, its lethality was just as high. However, it appears 
successful military operations have begun to have a cumulative effect even on AQIM. By 2010, 
the frequency of AQIM attacks have dropped nearly 90%. 
Philippines 
Despite reaching a ceasefire agreement, the MILF had its most violent year in 2003. 
However, by the following year, the MILF conducted only 3 attacks, a reduction of over 90%. 
The severity of its attacks also dropped over 80%. In contrast, after offering amnesty to the NPA, 
the frequency and severity continued to rise even three year later.  
While often criticized for its inability to control its members, the MILF appears just as  
successful in doing so. After 2003, the overall severity of attacks dropped nearly 60% while after 
the NPA amenesty of 2007, overall severity levels also dropped 60%. In practical terms, 
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conciliation appears to have had significantly reduced the loss of lives (See Table 40: 
Frequency and Severity of Terrorism, the Philippines). 
Table 39: Frequency and Severity of Terrorism, the Philippines 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Case 
Freq Freq Freq Freq Freq Freq Freq Freq Freq Freq Freq 
Philippines 97 42 35 74 22 16 46 53 74 76 67 
ASG 14 11 16 3 4 9 4 3 3 7 7 
JI 5 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 0 0 0 
MILF 55 11 4 50 3 0 2 3 21 8 1 
NPA 7 8 11 12 9 6 11 10 27 23 19 
UNK 14 11 3 9 6 1 26 29 23 36 40 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Case 
Sev Sev Sev Sev Sev Sev Sev Sev Sev Sev Sev 
Philippines 862 290 377 649 254 139 184 429 184 221 104 
ASG 95 127 306 8 126 131 33 22 6 22 31 
JI 122 0 0 0 0 0 0 113 0 0 0 
MILF 477 60 9 585 84 0 5 3 98 53 0 
NPA 65 21 30 39 32 8 9 19 59 20 38 
UNK 91 82 28 17 12 0 137 271 21 126 35 
Note: The unit of analysis was on a monthly basis however for the purposes to presentation the 
data was aggregated to the annual level.  
Concluding Remarks 
Several takeaways are important to mention. Offers of amnesty may be more effective 
when applied to insurgents then terrorists. In Algeria it took three years before the overall levels 
of frequency and severity were significantly reduced. However, it did successfully drain 
thousands of supporters from an insurgency that at one time poised an existential threat to the 
government. Similarly, with major agreements reached with the MILF including cooperation 
against other extremist groups, the Philippines successfully lowered terrorism levels. In the long 
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term, the 2003 agreement with the MILF appears to have led to significant reductions in both 
frequency and severity. 
Offering benefits to groups while attributing costs to leaders appears to have the greatest 
benefits. Unfortunately, the investigation failed to assess government actions towards the support 
population. This was the result of two factors. First, the coding process was unable to identify 
concessions to the support population. While there were instances such as payments to victims of 
government action, it was impossible to code them on a monthly basis. This remains the most 
serious limitation of the method and the investigation as whole. Second, it appears neither the 
Algerian or Philippine governments incorporated concessions to the support populations as 
major parts of their counterterrorist policies.  Regardless of the particular reason, the interaction 
between the government and the support population was not adequately assessed. This could be 
addressed by either adjusting the coding process or by including additional cases. 
While the project investigated effects upon specific groups, this process was severely 
hampered by the nature of the data. Due to the presence of an extreme amount of unknown 
perpetrators in the GTD, any conclusions regarding specific terrorist groups should be 
considered with hesitation. This by no means is a slight to the GTD; it merely reflects the data is 
only as good as the open sources that originally reported the information. Unfortunately due to 
the large number of unknown perpetrators, assessing the success or failure of government policy 
towards individual groups is problematic. With these issues acknowledged, the results at least 
suggest internal dynamics and the context of governmental action are more important than 
ideological factors. There did not seem to be any pattern of results among Islamic groups. This 
casts doubt upon Miller’s assertion that governmental responses need to be tailored to a group’s 
ideological beliefs (2007).   
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The two newly developed databases allow several topics for future research. First, it 
would be beneficial to expand the scope of the investigation. This is particularly true in regards 
to Algeria. By expanding the scope to twenty years, it would be interesting to see how the pattern 
of violence shifted from the 1990s during periods of insurgency to later when the conflict was 
dominated by terrorism. It would also be interesting to isolate certain time periods. For instance, 
it appears conciliation had different effects whether one compares the amnesty of 2000 to the 
amnesty of 2006. After regressing the same model with data between 2000 and 2005, 
conciliation had the effect of reducing the frequency of overall terrorism by nearly 5 attacks with 
a 1 month lag and a significance level of 1%. When comparing a similar regression between 
2006-2010, conciliation only reduced the frequency of overall terrorism by 2 attacks with a 
significance level of less then 10%.30  This may be the effect of negative reputation. Since the 
government reportedly did not honor its commitment to expand political participation, perhaps 
terrorists were less likely to participate in future amnesties. Or it could reflect increased 
radicalization or isolation from the very society, the terrorists wish to change, as was suggested 
by Crenshaw (1981). 
30	  This	  is	  not	  formally	  presented	  as	  a	  regression	  but	  merely	  serves	  as	  a	  point	  of	  discussion	  for	  future	  research.	  	  
Methodologically, there are three main areas to improve the research design. First, by 
including the initial month in Model 3, there may be confusion in what is actually happening first, 
the independent variable or the dependent variable. For instance, with denial, increases in 
terrorism may have occurred first followed by the government's response, roadblocks. Even if 
they successfully decreased terrorism, it would appear as the opposite. Second, conciliation with 
groups could be coded as a simple dummy variable rather than a categorical variable. Third, in
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This research assessed four common governmental responses: conciliation, denial, legal 
restriction, and violence. Conciliation appears to have mixed results. In general, the results show 
that conciliation may led to increases in terrorism in the short term while suggesting potential 
reductions in the long term. Concessions such as amnesties without political concessions do not 
address root grievances and therefore their effects may be limited. Denial and legal restriction 
often led to increases in terrorism, merely forcing terrorists to shift targets. While the effects of 
violence often depended upon whether it was applied to groups or their leaderships. 
Unfortunately, the most successful policies, whether those of conciliation or violence, often 
drove defectors to more radical, lethal groups. At this point, governments must be willing and 
capable to engage these groups violently, concentrating their efforts on terrorist leaders.  
Because the databases cover some responses in even more detail than what was covered in 
this study, a series of investigations could explore one response at a time in greater depth. For 
instance, the effects of arrests and kills could be separately investigated. Similarly, it would be 
interesting to see if arresting leaders is more beneficial than killing them, due to increased 
intelligence gains following interrogation. Research could also investigate whether conciliation 
causes terrorist infighting and does that infighting actually affect the frequency and severity of 
terrorism.    
order to avoid too few events per variable as was often the case with conciliation with leaders, 
legal restriction, and violence with leaders. In order to avoid variables with too few events, future 
research could combine conciliation with groups with conciliation with leaders and violence 
against groups with violence against leaders. Unfortunately, legal restriction unless defined 
differently, would have to be dropped.  
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31	   The	   Appendix	   is	   ordered	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   frequency	   and	   then	   severity.	   Regressions	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   the	   overall	  levels	  are	  presented	  first,	  followed	  by	  individual	  organizations	  in	  alphabetical	  order.	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Frequency 





1 Month Lag 2 Month Lag 3 Month Lag 
 .7575237 -4.633338 2.835449  1.72981 
concil_group_all (0.45) (3.98)*** (1.51) (1.29) 
5.629511 10.36672 -5.057051  -3.452627 
concil_leader_all (1.84)* (3.22)*** (1.65) (1.73)*
2.003844 .43087 -.6436911 -1.599527 
denial (2.07)** (0.41) (0.65) (1.40) 
4.305961 3.258987 7.292083 1.700537 
legal_rest (1.76)* (1.43) (2.36)** (0.60) 
-.0075005 -.0098522 .0041655  -.0300579 
vio_group_all (0.80) (0.83) (0.37) (2.80)*** 
-.0014455 -3.024652 -1.341639  -.2028817 
















Note: Absolute value of t-statistic in parentheses. *p ≤ .10; **p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01 (two-tailed 
tests). n = 132.  
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.9242292 -.8190965 -.0264912 -.4214097 
concil_group_all (1.50) (1.82)* (0.07) (0.70) 
-1.634201 1.954878  1.249368 -.3309473 
concil_leader_all (1.22) (1.49) (0.92) (0.27) 
-.1815688 1.056065 .217147 -.4207234  
Denial (0.44) (2.79)*** (0.52) (0.89) 
1.034715 .4339754 .7667104 -1.784084 
legal_rest (1.24)  (0.47) (0.90) (2.03)** 
-.0142857 -.0202511 -.0194151 .0107132 
vio_group_aqcom (0.84) (0.93) (0.84) (0.63) 
-1.222053 -.4595228 -1.428179  .1780371 
















Note: Absolute value of t-statistic in parentheses. *p ≤ .10; **p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01 (two-tailed 
tests). n = 132.  
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.7825022 -.2183844 .0819636 .0428538 
concil_group_all (1.66)* (0.41) (0.21) (0.10) 
 -.696716 .4708222 -.3172168 -.0939541 
concil_leader_all (-0.91) (0.55) (0.51) (0.15) 
.3234785 .2434527  -.52832 -.0703683 
denial (1.06) (0.79) (1.76)* (0.27) 
.0511065  .4188917 -.9863446 -1.218469 
legal_rest (0.09) (0.66) (1.74)* (1.82)* 
-.0270168 .0161046 .0185381  -.0139238 
vio_group_gia (2.39)** (1.37) (1.40) (1.27) 
-.89391 -1.315935  -.785759 -.3396331 
















Note: Absolute value of t-statistic in parentheses. *p ≤ .10; **p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01 (two-tailed 
tests). n = 132.  
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Month 1 Month Lag 2 Month Lag 3 Month Lag 
concil_group_all .6155894 -2.723785 1.932421 1.495312 
(0.42) (3.60)*** (1.68)* (1.84)* 
concil_leader_all 1.909647 5.938581 -3.049412 -3.886007 
(0.81) (2.76)*** (1.49) (2.29)** 
denial 1.20839 .5504887 .1327337 -.9336178 
(1.76)* (0.66) (0.19) (1.02) 
legal_rest 1.910232 2.878457 7.676346 .789517 
(1.06) (1.89)* (3.51)*** (0.37) 
vio_group_all -.0093361 -.0054329 -.0079698 -.0133095 
(1.24) (0.49) (0.77) (1.74)* 
vio_lead_all  1.067375 -1.076994 -1.123648 .6428765 
















Note: Absolute value of t-statistic in parentheses. *p ≤ .10; **p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01 (two-tailed 
tests). n = 132.  
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1 Month Lag 2 Month Lag 3 Month Lag 
-8.356025 -24.7793 28.77254 -4.974243 
concil_group_all (0.68) (1.61) (2.15)** (0.34) 
66.7487 95.49078  -43.9947 -10.59345 
concil_leader_all (2.35)** (3.13)*** (1.74)* (0.44) 
21.27012 -25.67259 -10.39566 -6.238397 
denial (0.93) (1.23) (0.89) (0.38) 
32.53828 22.63156  21.31495 41.43288 
legal_rest (1.25) (1.14) (0.68) ( 1.38 ) 
-.0942601 -.2308795 -.0420485 -.4983053 
vio_group_all (0.56) (2.16)** (0.26) (3.81)*** 
30.84742 -25.41561 -21.12151 -6.908359  











urban_percent_lag (1.10 ) 
-.1960515  
Constant (0.07 ) 
 0.3422 
R-Squared 
Note: Absolute value of t-statistic in parentheses. *p ≤ .10; **p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01 (two-tailed 
tests). n = 132.  
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1 Month Lag 2 Month Lag 3 Month Lag 
3.501812 -4.953386 9.029194  -3.252415 
concil_group_all (0.46) (0.69) (1.12) (0.49) 
30.94445  -.0065038  38.30727 -22.41938 
concil_leader_all (1.41) (0.00) (2.14)** (1.75)* 
11.86327 -4.421608 -2.118514 -9.419828 
denial (0.85) (0.57) (0.27) (1.21) 
12.40563  -.9984999 -6.706176 -8.112475 
legal_rest (1.10) (0.16) (0.45) (0.92) 
.4394835 -.4421076 -.2229959 -.4015139 
vio_group_aqcom (1.16) (1.39) (0.97) (0.95) 
-19.71461 -40.20058 -15.98201 -25.11154 
















Note: Absolute value of t-statistic in parentheses. *p ≤ .10; **p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01 (two-tailed 
tests). n = 132.  
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1 Month Lag 2 Month Lag 3 Month Lag 
6.412661 -3.626383  9.034644 -2.70915 
concil_group_all (0.59) (0.36) (1.28) (0.49) 
-1.99636 2.165875 -13.63244 .9154127 
concil_leader_all (0.14) (0.15) (1.40) (0.11) 
3.918125 4.722641 -6.361557 5.615846 
denial (0.97) (1.23) (1.68)* (1.88)* 
-8.312359 6.510674  -14.03025 -18.13072 
legal_rest (1.49) (1.00) (1.96)** (1.93)** 
-.5256617 .0308583 -.0749648 -.2254425 
vio_group_gia (3.16)*** (0.16) (0.36) (1.21) 
-7.528492 -10.74066 -8.472983 1.200289 
















Note: Absolute value of t-statistic in parentheses. *p ≤ .10; **p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01 (two-tailed 
tests). n = 132.  
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1 Month Lag 2 Month Lag 3 Month Lag 
-2.578341  -16.92073 11.15312 1.942152 
concil_group_all (0.38) (3.08)*** (2.10)** (0.22) 
24.47432 50.43908 -14.42283 -7.405842 
concil_leader_all (1.47) (3.39)*** (1.18) (0.63) 
-3.347251 5.297331  3.972471  -3.463235 
denial (0.64) (0.75) (0.64) (0.44) 
10.81248 30.41119 73.27514 24.37985 
legal_rest (0.71) (2.10)** (3.79)*** (1.27) 
-.0983012 -.1002583 -.1482229 -.0921095 
vio_group_all (1.09) (1.39) (1.91)* (1.55) 
12.93121 -8.427351 -14.76904 2.229169 
















Note: Absolute value of t-statistic in parentheses. *p ≤ .10; **p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01 (two-tailed 
tests). n = 132.  
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32	  The	  Appendix	  is	  ordered	  by	  frequency	  and	  then	  severity.	  Regressions	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  are	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  first,	  followed	  by	  individual	  organizations	  in	  alphabetical	  order.	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Frequency 





1 Month Lag 2 Month Lag 3 Month Lag 
3.068167 1.06945 1.002351 .3306092 
concil_group_all ( 2.51)** (1.01) (1.06) (0.42) 
.9457803 3.245964 -4.202523  1.516138 
concil_leader_all (0.41) (1.57) (2.06)** (0.50) 
2.132783 1.129608 -.6052695 -1.317181 
denial (2.46)** (1.20) (0.51) (1.16) 
1.241378  -2.758799 1.610039 1.633069 
legal_rest (0.84) (1.78)* (0.88) (1.10) 
.0582176 .0228935 .0111165 .0066943 
vio_group_all (5.88)** (2.49)* (1.11) (0.85) 
 1.170993 -.032239 -2.915592  -2.111335 
















Note: Absolute value of t-statistic in parentheses. *p ≤ .10; **p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01 (two-tailed 
tests). n = 132.  
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Month 1 Month Lag 2 Month Lag 3 Month Lag 
.5489756 .1038576 .8522221 1.16825 
concil_group_milf (1.02) (0.18) (1.03) (1.27) 
-.2538677 -.7627398 -.7627398 .0934735 
concil_leader_milf (0.59) (1.71)* (1.01) (0.19) 
.3700598 -.54026 -.1689824 .078349 
Denial (1.17) (1.58) (0.60) (0.32) 
-.4365046 .2955955 -.1522843  -.2775417 
legal_rest (1.07) (0.65) (0.38) (0.68) 
.001894 .0016477 .0021253 .0010163 
vio_group_abu (0.74) (0.71) (0.74) (0.42) 
 -.4039995 .1255298 -1.003574  -.4336471 
















Note: Absolute value of t-statistic in parentheses. *p ≤ .10; **p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01 (two-tailed 
tests). n = 132.  
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Month 1 Month Lag 2 Month Lag 3 Month Lag 
.0344802 -.0126348 .1447659 .0020855 
concil_group_milf (0.43) (0.10) (1.52) (0.02) 
.1521423 -.3376485 -.0360768 -.0893845 
concil_leader_milf (0.99) (1.27) (0.31) (0.61) 
-.0657369 -.0691904 -.0820889 .3022002 
denial (0.66) (0.56) (0.54  ) (1.44) 
.0227248  .1274728 -.1380994 -.0708031 
legal_rest (0.24) (1.15) (1.32) (0.62) 
.0377675 .0107433 -.0579145 .0065948 
vio_group_ji (1.03) (0.30) (1.52) (0.23) 
.1613433 -.5550262  -.1989477 -.6925183 
















Note: Absolute value of t-statistic in parentheses. *p ≤ .10; **p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01 (two-tailed 
tests). n = 132.  
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Month 1 Month Lag 2 Month Lag 3 Month Lag 
2.689321 .5983138 1.26227  -.3300411 
concil_group_milf (1.20) (0.54) ( 1.12) (-0.46) 
2.236889 1.52709  -2.79804 1.976444 
concil_leader_milf (1.37) (0.92) (1.08) (0.87) 
1.015893 1.138301 .0541802  -.1756992 
Denial (2.51)** (2.66)*** (0.13) (0.48) 
.4145799 -1.680038 .2688525 .051174 
legal_rest (0.70) (2.65)*** (0.55) (0.09) 
.0585054 .018875 .0022563 -.0044974 
vio_group_milf (5.27)*** (2.25)** (0.24) (0.78) 
 -.1759313  1.31756 .7201776  -1.025558 
















Note: Absolute value of t-statistic in parentheses. *p ≤ .10; **p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01 (two-tailed 
tests). n = 132.  
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Month 1 Month Lag 2 Month Lag 3 Month Lag 
.1008972 .737994 .3604573  -.1084097  
concil_group_npa (0.16) (1.11) (0.84) (0.28) 
.8820524 1.002368 -1.270595 -2.703881 
concil_leader_npa (0.83) (0.70) (1.57) (2.16)** 
.5100247  -.2500122 -.3171462 -.7685193 
Denial (1.42) (0.74) (0.64) (1.79)* 
-.1700876 -.2592077 .5022122 .9495755  
legal_rest (0.37) (0.37) (0.67) (1.69)* 
.0387379 .0237277 .0268009 .0310681 
vio_group_npa (2.27)** (1.23) (1.21) (1.45) 
















Note: Absolute value of t-statistic in parentheses. *p ≤ .10; **p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01 (two-tailed 
tests). n = 132.  
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Month 1 Month Lag 2 Month Lag 3 Month Lag 
.7337408  -.2241876 -.7050884 -.0635682 
concil_group_all (1.77)* (0.51) (1.48) (0.14) 
-.6664543 2.303694  -.822451 -1.959599 
concil_leader_all (0.49) (1.55) (0.83) (1.58) 
.6791516 .4738992 -.6445071 -.2530302  
denial (1.28) (0.85) (0.95) (0.36) 
.1374477 -.6002109 .1138687   .5998975 
legal_rest (0.21) (0.88) (0.14) (0.99) 
.0080408 .00385 .0039207  .0025381 
vio_group_all (2.18)** (1.15) (1.04) (0.59) 
.4816167 -.575766  -1.283046 -1.223561 
















Note: Absolute value of t-statistic in parentheses. *p ≤ .10; **p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01 (two-tailed 
tests). n = 132.  
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Severity  





1 Month Lag 2 Month Lag 3 Month Lag 
11.58266  7.650972 13.83424 6.75842 
concil_group_all (0.95) (0.75) (1.38) (0.95) 
11.40736 16.80996 26.32588 -3.793119 
concil_leader_all (0.81) (2.02)** (2.53)** (0.21) 
12.10541 2.663095 -5.632643 -4.793846 
denial (1.93) (0.52) (-0.91) (-0.72) 
9.293258 -10.77486 8.962269 12.75379 
legal_rest (1.27) (1.46) (1.25) (1.25) 
.3249164  .074915 .2606554  .0219596 
vio_group_all (3.51)*** (0.70) (3.29)*** (0.28) 
8.907585 3.102078 -17.22661 -3.65279 
















Note: Absolute value of t-statistic in parentheses. *p ≤ .10; **p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01 (two-tailed 
tests). n = 132.  
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Month 1 Month Lag 2 Month Lag 3 Month Lag 
21.16331 -.7368992 11.84599 41.16816  
concil_group_milf (1.45) (0.05) (0.54) (1.45) 
.2710173 -.5482785 1.852581 -.9645567 
concil_leader_milf (0.03) (0.06) (0.16) (0.08) 
5.749192  -8.695357 .5151115 -2.238578 
Denial (0.63) (1.18) (0.09) (0.39) 
-.1100235 6.789067 .9668076 -13.29077 
legal_rest (0.01) ( 0.73) (0.15) (1.57) 
.0821698 .0567823 .0252684 .0035884 
vio_group_abu (1.13) (0.88) (0.35) (0.07) 
-5.700873 .4335872 -15.07171 -3.833833  
















Note: Absolute value of t-statistic in parentheses. *p ≤ .10; **p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01 (two-tailed 
tests). n = 132.  
136	  




Month 1 Month Lag 2 Month Lag 3 Month Lag 
.6538745 2.423996 4.22324 2.07706 
concil_group_milf (0.34) (0.70) (1.92)* (1.09) 
3.163214 -7.639556 .0105529 -2.147603 
concil_leader_milf (0.89) (1.12) (0.00) (0.67) 
-.74404 .6416379 -.2083897 6.983289 
Denial (0.35) (0.22) (0.05) (1.33) 
-.9733923 1.58769 -3.903893 -.1416185 
legal_rest (0.41) (0.56) (1.43) (0.04) 
.7745115 .2396742 -1.395171 .7445588  
vio_group_ji (0.96) (0.32) (1.42) (1.06) 
-9.146185 -19.39559 -15.51007 -20.26576 
















Note: Absolute value of t-statistic in parentheses. *p ≤ .10; **p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01 (two-tailed 
tests). n = 132.  
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Month 1 Month Lag 2 Month Lag 3 Month Lag 
7.633843 -2.674646 13.36519 -1.29865 
concil_group_milf (0.73) (0.22) (1.04) (0.20) 
-3.153154 3.597295 -35.88649 -23.92669 
concil_leader_milf (0.26) (0.23) (1.73)* (1.29) 
8.277825 4.994665 1.077757 -1.739772 
Denial (1.66)* (1.47) (0.31) (0.52) 
 5.192356 -7.163538  8.790237 .6396101 
legal_rest (1.26) (1.52) (1.79)* (0.15) 
.3578623  .0887519 .1725766 .0346879 
vio_group_milf (2.66)*** (0.54) (1.62) (0.39) 
 -3.910973 7.152248  1.316632 -5.521393 
















Note: Absolute value of t-statistic in parentheses. *p ≤ .10; **p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01 (two-tailed 
tests). n = 132.  
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Month 1 Month Lag 2 Month Lag 3 Month Lag 
-.1725718  .6295496 -2.10274  -1.412804 
concil_group_npa (0.10) (0.41) (1.62) (1.14) 
-1.923976 1.782284 .7331185 -10.5746 
concil_leader_npa (0.30) (0.48) (0.14) (2.50)** 
3.413438 .6136982  -1.069416 -.7520658 
Denial (1.55) (0.36) (0.71) (0.40) 
-3.971874 -3.417256 .4403843 2.993559 
legal_rest (1.82)* (1.64) (0.24) (1.67)* 
.048719 .0233148 .0359167 .1959882 
vio_group_npa (0.72) (0.37) (0.36) (1.99)** 
















Note: Absolute value of t-statistic in parentheses. *p ≤ .10; **p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01 (two-tailed 
tests). n = 132.  
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Month 1 Month Lag 2 Month Lag 3 Month Lag 
.2196835  4.933534 -4.204489 3.235764 
concil_group_all (0.03) (0.78) (0.75) (0.67) 
6.862837  5.795073  -4.498858 -3.645614 
concil_leader_all (2.54)** (2.38)** (0.96) (0.44) 
1.118812 -1.996175 -7.589275 -4.256952 
denial (0.36) (0.57) (1.65) (0.79) 
1.333786 .1964706 -1.727179  10.61692  
legal_rest (0.30) (0.04) (0.35) (1.28) 
.0862509 -.0061059 .1046572  -.0247622 
vio_group_all (1.92)* (0.15) (1.74)* (0.52) 
5.961009 1.602763 -17.25756 -9.54394 
















Note: Absolute value of t-statistic in parentheses. *p ≤ .10; **p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01 (two-tailed 
tests). n = 132.  
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